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JOHN C. DEHN*
ABSTRACT
Waterboarding and “much worse,” torture, and “tak[ing] out” the
family members of terrorists: President Trump endorsed these
measures while campaigning for office. After his inauguration,
Trump confirmed his view of the effectiveness of torture and has not
clearly rejected other measures forbidden by international law. This
Article therefore examines whether a President has the power to order
or authorize the military to violate international humanitarian law,
known as the “law of war.” Rather than assess whether the law of
war generally constrains a President as Commander-in-Chief,
however, its focus is the extent to which Congress requires the U.S.
military to comply with the law of war in its disciplinary code, the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). It clarifies how Article 18
of the UCMJ empowers military criminal courts, known as courts-
martial, to try and punish not only conduct denominated a “war
crime” by international law but also any other conduct for which the
law of war permits punishment by military tribunal. Punishable
conduct under Article 18 includes any law of war violation that
entails or results in a criminal offense under the UCMJ. Put
differently, this Article clarifies why reasonable compliance with the
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law of war is necessary to justify war measures that are otherwise
common crimes such as murder, maiming, and assault, that are
defined and made punishable by the UCMJ. This Article then
explains why this execution of the law of war in the UCMJ limits a
President’s authority as Commander-in-Chief: a President does not
possess constitutional power to override congressional regulation of
the military, particularly in matters of military discipline. So long
as the law of war component of Article 18 remains unchanged, no
President may order or authorize war crimes or most other law of
war violations that entail or result in a UCMJ offense.
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INTRODUCTION
As a candidate, President Trump said that he would authorize
waterboarding and “much worse,” that he believes “torture works,”
and if not, “they [referring to ‘terrorists’] deserve it anyway, for
what they’re doing.”1 After his inauguration, the President said he
would defer to his Secretary of Defense and Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) Director about the need for torture, but that “[i]f they
do wanna [sic] do [it], then I will work toward that end. I wanna
[sic] do everything I can within the bounds of what you’re allowed
to do legally.”2 Torture is an international war crime in both inter-
national3 and non-international4 armed conflict as well as a viola-
tion of the War Crimes Act, which is a generally applicable federal
criminal law.5 These statements therefore suggest that the Presi-
dent might seek an exemption from applicable federal criminal
laws and simply ignore international law prohibitions.
1. E.g., Jenna Johnson, Trump Says ‘Torture Works,’ Backs Waterboarding and ‘Much
Worse,’ WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-says-
torture-works-backs-waterboarding-and-much-worse/2016/02/17/4c9277be-d59c-11e5-b195-
2e29a4e13425_story.html?utm_term=.75496ecfcc54 [https://perma.cc/82JP-8ZVY]. 
2. E.g., Nolan D. McCaskill, Trump Says He’ll Defer to Mattis and Pompeo on
Waterboarding, POLITICO (Jan. 25, 2017, 3:13 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/
trump-waterboarding-mattis-pompeo-234174 [https://perma.cc/PPR4-HXWM].
3. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(a)(ii), July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICC Statute] (prescribing the war crime of “[t]orture or
inhuman treatment”); id. art. 8(2)(b)(xxi) (prescribing the war crime of “[c]ommitting outrages
upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment”).
4. Id. art. 8(2)(c)(i) (prescribing the war crime of “[v]iolence to life and person, in
particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture”); id. art. 8(2)(c)(ii)
(prescribing the war crime of “[c]ommitting outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment”).
5. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2012). Federal law defines and generally prohibits
torture. Additionally, the War Crimes Act prohibits “any conduct ... defined as a grave breach
in any of the international conventions signed at Geneva 12 August 1949.” Id. § 2441(c)(1).
Those conventions apply to international armed conflict and identify torture as a grave
breach. See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114 [hereinafter GC
I]. For non-international armed conflict, the War Crimes Act also prohibits any conduct that
“constitutes a grave breach of common Article 3,” 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(3), and is defined to
include “[t]orture,” id. § 2441(d)(1)(A), and “[c]ruel or [i]nhuman [t]reatment,” id.
§ 2441(d)(1)(B). Therefore, the War Crimes Act prohibits torture in both international and
non-international armed conflict, as well as in other circumstances pursuant to the general
torture prohibition.
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Mr. Trump also stated that America should “take out the[ ] fami-
lies” of terrorists,6 a view he has not clearly renounced since be-
coming President.7 Intentionally attacking innocent civilians in an
armed conflict is an international war crime,8 and also a violation
of the War Crimes Act.9 The legality of a family member’s death
under the law of war, however, depends upon the circumstances un-
der which it occurs. For example, if family-member deaths were inci-
dental to an attack upon a lawful target in an armed conflict, and
not excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated from
that attack, they would likely be lawful.10 Unlike torture, which is
categorically prohibited, the legality of an attack and its conse-
quences often depends upon a contextual analysis of facts that were
or should have been known to the person ordering it.11 Commenta-
tors have observed that the President’s prior statements may lead
to criminal accusations against U.S. service members every time
family-member deaths occur unless he clearly disavows them.12
Previous presidential administrations have expressed different
views regarding a President’s authority to authorize violations of
international or domestic law in war. Relying on the commander-in-
chief power, the George W. Bush Administration asserted condi-
6. E.g., Tom LoBianco, Donald Trump on Terrorists: ‘Take out Their Families,’ CNN,
(Dec. 3, 2015, 12:19 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/02/politics/donald-trump-terrorists-
families/index.html [https://perma.cc/M7LX-6HHD].
7. See, e.g., Adam Taylor, Trump Said He Would ‘Take out’ the Families of ISIS Fighters.
Did an Airstrike in Syria Do Just That?, WASH. POST (May 27, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/05/27/trump-said-he-would-take-out-the-families-of-isis-
fighters-did-an-airstrike-in-syria-do-just-that/?utm_term=.be157295541e [https://perma.cc/
X6K7-AHFR] (indicating that Trump, besides a statement in March 2016 that he “would not
kill terrorists’ families but only ‘go after them,’” has not explicitly disavowed his intention to
target families of terrorists since becoming President).
8. See, e.g., ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 8(2)(b)(i), (e)(i) (identifying the war crimes of
intentionally attacking the civilian population or “individual civilians not taking direct part
in hostilities” for both international and non-international armed conflict).
9. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(1) (international armed conflict); id. § 2441(d)(1)(D) (non-
international armed conflict).
10. It is an international war crime when the anticipated loss of civilian lives or injury to
civilians and damage to civilian objects is “clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct ... military advantage anticipated” from an attack. See, e.g., ICC Statute, supra note 3,
art. 8(2)(b)(iv) (emphasis added).
11. See id.
12. See Steven J. Barela & Amos Guiora, Campaign Promises of War Crimes: Now a Stain
on the Military, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 6, 2017, 9:43 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/37348/
campaign-promises-war-crimes-stain-military/ [https://perma.cc/R8E8-7EDE].
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tional constitutional authority to violate not only the torture prohi-
bition of international law, but also the generally applicable federal
criminal statutes implementing it.13 The Obama Administration
claimed that its policies complied with applicable international and
domestic law,14 but did not clarify the extent to which either bind
the President in his role as Commander-in-Chief. Obama claimed to
have developed “a policy framework to ensure that ... the United
States not only meets but also in important respects exceeds the
safeguards that apply as a matter of law in the course of an armed
conflict.”15 He never clarified whether the Constitution or other
domestic law made this “policy framework” obligatory or whether
the “safeguards” to which he referred included international law of
war obligations.16
Ambiguity regarding a President’s obligation to comply with
international law, including the law of war, arises from general
uncertainty about the relationship of international law to the
Constitution and laws of the United States.17 Although international
legal norms are always obligatory from the perspective of interna-
tional law, the extent to which they are obligatory or enforceable in
the U.S. legal system is not always clear.18 Courts and commenta-
tors have offered various theories about the circumstances under
which international treaty or customary norms either are or become
obligatory in domestic law and enforceable in federal courts.19
Because of this ambiguity, commentators analyzing the Presi-
dent’s war powers take diverse approaches to the issue of whether
13. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in THE TOR-
TURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172, 200 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel
eds., 2005) (asserting “if an interrogation method arguably were to violate” a federal criminal
statute prohibiting torture, “the statute would be unconstitutional if it impermissibly en-
croached on the President’s constitutional power to conduct a military campaign”).
14. See THE WHITE HOUSE, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING
THE UNITED STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS,
at i (2016).
15. Id. (emphasis added).
16. Id. The report referred to safeguards regarding “the preservation of civilian life,
transparency, and accountability.” Id. 
17. See John C. Dehn, Customary International Law, the Separation of Powers, and the
Choice of Law in Armed Conflicts and Wars, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 2089, 2093-94 (2016).
18. See id.
19. I have concisely surveyed the range of scholarly opinion elsewhere. See id.
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a President must comply with the law of war. Some commentators
argue that international law, including the law of war, is part of the
laws that a President is constitutionally obligated to “take Care” to
“faithfully execute[].”20 Other commentary addresses whether
statutes authorizing military force should be interpreted to require
compliance with the law of war.21 I have elsewhere argued that legal
theory, Supreme Court case law, and early American legal commen-
tary support the view that customary laws of war inherently apply
to armed conflicts with foreign entities and are enforceable in
federal courts.22 The focus of most such commentary however is
whether, as a general legal matter, a President acting as Command-
er-in-Chief must comply with applicable international laws of war.
This Article more narrowly focuses on congressional regulation of
the military, specifically, the extent to which Congress requires the
20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 50 (2d ed. 1996) (“U.S. treaties and customary international law that
have domestic normative quality ... are also law of the land, and Presidents have asserted re-
sponsibility (and authority) ... to see that they are ‘faithfully executed.’”); David Golove,
Military Tribunals, International Law, and the Constitution: A Franckian-Madisonian
Approach, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 363, 378-80 (2003); Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans
and Authorizations to Violate International Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of
Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 811, 856 (2005) (“Under the Constitution, the
President is expressly bound to faithfully execute the laws, which include treaty law and
customary international law.” (footnote omitted)); Michael D. Ramsey, Torturing Executive
Power, 93 GEO. L.J. 1213, 1231-35 (2005); Edward T. Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 331, 335-36 (2008).
21. Compare Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of Force, International Law,
and the Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REV. 293, 299 (2005) (“The participation of the
political branches in the development of international humanitarian law, the formal and
informal commitments made by the Executive Branch to follow that law during armed
conflict, the long-standing nature of the Charming Betsy canon, and other factors all provide
sound reasons for the courts to conclude that general authorizations for the use of force do not
embrace violations of international law by the President.”), with Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047,
2098-99 (2005) (“There is a significant question whether the canon applies in the very
different context of a grant of discretionary enforcement authority to the President, especially
when the grant of discretionary enforcement authority, like the AUMF, overlaps with the
President’s independent constitutional powers. Assuming that the canon does apply in this
context, it would not follow that the AUMF should be read to prohibit violations of interna-
tional law. The canon simply requires that ambiguous statutes be construed not to violate
international law. At most, then, application of the canon to the AUMF would yield the
interpretation that the AUMF does not authorize the President to violate international law.
It would not yield the quite different interpretation that the AUMF affirmatively prohibits
the President from violating international law.” (footnotes omitted)).
22. See generally Dehn, supra note 17.
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military to comply with the law of war in its disciplinary code, the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Article 18 of the UCMJ
vests military criminal courts, called courts-martial, with “jurisdic-
tion to try persons subject to [the UCMJ] for any offense made
punishable by [the UCMJ]” and also “to try any person who by the
law of war is subject to trial by a military tribunal and [to] adjudge
any punishment permitted by the law of war.”23 This Article ex-
plains how these jurisdictional grants are complementary and ef-
fectively implement most of the law of war in U.S. military criminal
law. Stated concisely: Article 18 empowers courts-martial to identify
and punish (1) law of war violations denominated war crimes by
international law, (2) certain activities by or on behalf of an enemy
for which the law of war provides no immunity from punishment,
and (3) any other law of war violation by U.S. service members or
any civilians accompanying them that entails or results in a crime
under the UCMJ.24 In other words, both service members and any
civilians accompanying them in an armed conflict may be punished
for a law of war violation, as such, or a UCMJ offense, such as mur-
der and assault,25 that are entailed in or result from a law of war
violation.26
This Article then addresses why this implementation of the law
of war in the UCMJ limits the President’s authority as Commander-
in-Chief. Because Congress has plenary constitutional authority to
regulate the armed forces, particularly in matters of discipline,27 the
UCMJ necessarily limits the President’s authority as Commander-
in-Chief. Even assuming a President possesses some modicum of
general constitutional authority to violate international law, no
President may order or authorize the military to violate the UCMJ,
23. 10 U.S.C. § 818(a) (Supp. IV 2017).
24. See id.
25. The crime of murder is codified at 10 U.S.C. § 918 (2012), amended by 10 U.S.C. § 918
(Supp. IV 2017); assault is codified at 10 U.S.C. § 928 (2012), amended by 10 U.S.C. § 928
(Supp. IV 2017). Other crimes applicable to typical battlefield behavior include, but are not
limited to: maiming, 10 U.S.C. § 924 (2012), amended by 10 U.S.C. § 928a (Supp. IV 2017);
arson, 10 U.S.C. § 926 (2012), amended by 10 U.S.C. § 926 (Supp. IV 2017); and burglary, 10
U.S.C. § 929 (2012), amended by 10 U.S.C. § 929 (Supp. IV 2017).
26. Crimes defined in the UCMJ are applicable “in all places.” 10 U.S.C. § 805 (2012).
27. Among its powers, Congress may “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of
the land and naval Forces.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
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including its binding implementation of the law of war.28 As this
Article will later explain, however, the law of war sometimes
requires the exercise of judgment based upon available informa-
tion.29 This means a President might order or authorize acts that
are technically illegal under the circumstances but would not be
known or understood to be clearly unlawful by those ordered or
authorized to engage in them.30
To explain the intricate relationship between the law of war and
the UCMJ, this Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I demonstrates
the current ambiguity in U.S. military administrative publications
and federal judicial decisions regarding the extent to which U.S.
law, including the UCMJ, requires compliance with the law of war.
Part II reviews the evolution of military criminal tribunal jurisdic-
tion that led to the adoption of Article 18 in order to clarify Article
18’s purpose and effect. Part III considers three issues of statutory
interpretation: the legal effect of Article 18, the correct understand-
ing of the term “law of war” referenced in it, and two of the main
categories of offenses for which it effectively creates municipal
criminal offenses and authorizes punishment. Part IV explains the
relationship of law of war violations to the crimes defined in the
punitive articles of the UCMJ. It clarifies why almost all law of war
violations may be punished by courts-martial, and why law of war
compliance is necessary to provide a public authority justification
defense for acts of war that entail or result in common crimes that
are prescribed in and made punishable by the UCMJ. Part V
explains why the binding implementation of the law of war in the
UCMJ necessarily limits a President’s authority to authorize or
order most law of war violations by the members of the armed forces
or by civilians accompanying the military in armed conflict. It then
briefly examines the practical effect of this limitation.
A few initial caveats are necessary. First, this Article deals only
with the law regulating the conduct of hostilities and protection of
victims in armed conflict, known as the jus in bello. It does not
address domestic constitutional authority to initiate war in light of
international law regulating the resort to force, known as the jus ad
28. See infra text accompanying notes 54-60.
29. See infra Part IV.B.2.
30. See infra Part V.B.
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bellum, or the related international crime of aggression.31 Addition-
ally, this Article does not address military operations to which the
international law of war does not apply.32 And finally, given its focus
on U.S. military law, this Article does not address whether a Pres-
ident may order or authorize civilian government employees who
are not part of or accompanying the military in an armed conflict to
violate the law of war.
I. AMBIGUITY REGARDING LAW OF WAR COMPLIANCE
One week after the September 11, 2001, attacks, Congress adopt-
ed an Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 AUMF).33 It
sanctions the President’s “use [of] all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided [the September 11th
attacks], or harbored such organizations or persons.”34 The executive
branch has relied upon this authorization to conduct military
operations against an array of non-state armed groups for over
fifteen years.35 And yet, these many years later, the scope and na-
ture of “necessary and appropriate” military measures authorized
by the 2001 AUMF remains largely unsettled. Importantly, it is still
31. See, e.g., Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art.
8 bis, June 11, 2010, C.N.651.2010.TREATIES-8.
32. This Article does not address uses of force against non-state actors that do not occur
within or create an armed conflict. 
33. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2012)). This Article uses “AUMF” as shorthand for any
congressional authorization to use military force. When referring to a specific AUMF, it adds
the year of its adoption.
34. Id. § 2.
35. See Stephen W. Preston, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., The Legal Framework for the
United States’ Use of Military Force Since 9/11 (Apr. 10, 2015), https://www.defense.gov/
News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606662/ [https://perma.cc/VTC9-54PS] (“[T]he groups and
individuals against which the U.S. military [has taken] direct action (that is, capture or lethal
operations) under the authority of the 2001 AUMF, includ[e:] ... al-Qa’ida, the Taliban and
certain other terrorist or insurgent groups in Afghanistan; al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP) in Yemen; and individuals who are part of al-Qa’ida in Somalia and Libya. In addi-
tion, over the past year, we have conducted military operations under the 2001 AUMF against
the Nusrah Front and, specifically, those members of al-Qa’ida referred to as the Khorasan
Group in Syria. We have also resumed such operations against the group we fought in Iraq
when it was known as al-Qa’ida in Iraq, which is now known as ISIL.”); see also Address to
the Nation on United States Strategy to Combat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL) Terrorist Organization, 2014 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 1-2 (Sept. 10, 2014).
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not clear whether the military measures undertaken pursuant to
the 2001 AUMF must comply with international law regulating
armed conflict, known as international humanitarian law or the
“law of war.”
There are at least two significant sources of ambiguity. First,
Department of Defense (DoD) guidance does not adequately clarify
whether members of the U.S. military are legally obligated to com-
ply with the law of war and suggests, without clarifying, that an
executive branch official may authorize violations of it. Second,
recent judicial decisions do not clarify the extent to which the U.S.
Constitution or other domestic law requires law of war compliance
by the President and military. This Part briefly outlines key aspects
of current DoD guidance and recent judicial opinions that demon-
strate this ambiguity.
A. Department of Defense Guidance
The seminal DoD guidance on the law of war is an administrative
directive titled the DoD Law of War Program. It states, “It is DoD
policy that: ... [m]embers of the DoD Components comply with the
law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are
characterized, and in all other military operations.”36 If the law of
war truly is “law” for our armed forces, it is not clear why com-
pliance is required by “policy.” Perhaps the directive intends only
to clarify that operational planners should assume that the law of
war applies. What is clear, however, is that if law of war compliance
is required only by DoD policy rather than federal law, an autho-
rized DoD official or a President may grant general or specific
exceptions to the policy and authorize law of war violations.
This same directive also specifies that the Department of Defense
Law of War Manual (Law of War Manual) is “the authoritative
statement on the law of war within the Department of Defense.”37
The Law of War Manual, however, is equivocal regarding the ex-
tent to which law of war compliance is obligatory under the UCMJ
36. Dep’t of Def. Directive 2311.01E, DoD Law of War Program, para. 4.1 (2006) (empha-
sis added). It is also policy that contractors comply with U.S. law of war obligations. Id. para.
4.2.
37. Id. para. 5.1.3.
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or other domestic law. In a foreword, the DoD General Counsel
states only that obeying the law of war “is the right thing to do.”38
Rather than clearly state whether law of war compliance is legally
required, however, the Law of War Manual provides, “The specific
legal force of a law of war rule under U.S. domestic law may depend
on whether that rule takes the form of a self-executing treaty, non-
self-executing treaty, or customary international law.”39 With regard
to treaties, the manual declares that although they “are part of U.S.
law,” “[t]he terms ‘self-executing’ and ‘non-self-executing’ may be
used to explain how a treaty is to take effect in U.S. domestic law.”40
With respect to customary international law, the manual states that
it, too, “is part of U.S. law” but only “insofar as it is not inconsistent
with any treaty to which the United States is a Party, or a control-
ling executive or legislative act.”41 The Law of War Manual does not
clarify what might qualify as a self-executing treaty or what a
“controlling executive or legislative act” might be.
Although the Law of War Manual later declares that law of war
violations may be prosecuted under the UCMJ,42 this statement
requires clarification in light of the ambiguities just mentioned. If
a “controlling executive act” might sometimes displace, or excuse
compliance with the law of war, then any executive branch official
possessing authority to adopt one may potentially authorize law of
war violations. Furthermore, although the Law of War Manual
asserts that law of war violations may be charged as violations of
various UCMJ punitive articles, it does not clarify precisely how the
law of war relates to the crimes defined in the UCMJ.43
38. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR
MANUAL  ii (2015 & Supp. Dec. 2016) [hereinafter LAW OF WAR MANUAL].
39. Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 38-39 (emphasis added). While those familiar with self-execution doctrine
related to treaties know to what this passage refers, the Law of War Manual does little to
clarify it and creates further ambiguity by using the term “may.” For a concise review of the
debate surrounding self-execution doctrine, see David H. Moore, Response, Law(Makers) of
the Land: The Doctrine of Treaty Non-Self-Execution, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 32 (2008); and
Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial
Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599 (2008); see also Dehn, supra note 17, at 2093-
94.
41. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 38, at 39.
42. Id. at 1119.
43. The Law of War Manual’s treatment of this topic is discussed in more detail in Part IV.
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B. Judicial Ambiguity
The Law of War Manual’s opacity on these issues likely stems
from the fact that recent judicial opinions provide little clarity.
Supreme Court decisions addressing the 2001 AUMF have been
vague regarding the precise status of the law of war as “law” for the
President and military. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, five members of the
Supreme Court—a plurality of four and Justice Clarence Thomas in
dissent—interpreted the 2001 AUMF to include the power to detain
an enemy belligerent indefinitely.44 According to the plurality, such
detention power “is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war
as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ Con-
gress has authorized the President to use.”45 In other words, when
applicable,46 law of war norms inform the nature of military mea-
sures that the 2001 AUMF authorizes. Unfortunately, the Court has
not clarified the extent to which the law of war inherently limits the
2001 AUMF, nor has it explained which law of war treaties are
“self-executing” or what a “controlling executive act” might be.47
44. 542 U.S. 507, 518-21 (2004); id. at 587-88 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (“[T]he power to
detain does not end with the cessation of formal hostilities.” (citing Madsen v. Kinsella, 343
U.S. 341, 360 (1952); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 786 (1950); Moyer v. Peabody, 212
U.S. 78, 84 (1909))).
45. Id. at 518 (plurality opinion).
46. The plurality clarified that its conclusion was conditional upon the nature of the hos-
tilities resulting from an AUMF. Id. at 521 (“[W]e understand Congress’ grant of authority
for the use of ‘necessary and appropriate force’ to include the authority to detain for the
duration of the relevant conflict, and our understanding is based on longstanding law-of-war
principles. If the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the
conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel.”).
47. Some courts and commentators point to the Court’s statement in The Paquete Habana
that “[i]nternational law is part of our law,” 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), as evidence that
international law is federal law in the U.S. legal system. See, e.g., Igartúa v. United States,
626 F.3d 592, 619 (1st Cir. 2010) (“We commence by stating what is beyond cavil:
‘[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts
of justice....’ This is not a new or remarkable concept. International law has been an integral
part of our constitutional system since the founding of our Nation.” (alteration and omission
in original) (quoting Habana, 175 U.S. at 700)); Carlos M. Vázquez, Customary International
Law as U.S. Law: A Critique of the Revisionist and Intermediate Positions and a Defense of
the Modern Position, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1516 (2011) (“The canonical expression
of the modern position is the statement in The Paquete Habana that ‘[i]nternational law is
part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented
for their determination.’” (footnote omitted) (alteration in original)). I have elsewhere argued
this statement might mean that international law must be observed by federal courts in
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In 2006, the Supreme Court implicitly held that when the law of
war is incorporated by reference in an applicable federal statute, a
President must comply with it. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, a majority
of the Supreme Court found President Bush’s 2001 military commis-
sions order did not comply with a law of war obligation that it con-
cluded had been implemented by the UCMJ.48 Specifically, the
Court found that UCMJ Article 21, which then regulated all mili-
tary commissions,49 required compliance with a provision of the four
1949 Geneva Conventions known as “Common Article 3.”50 Because
the Court found the President’s order did not comply with Common
Article 3, it held that the President’s order violated Article 21 and
was unlawful.51 Unfortunately, resolution of this case did not re-
quire the Court to clarify the full extent to which the UCMJ general-
ly incorporates and requires compliance with applicable laws of war.
More recently still, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals deliberately avoided addressing whether the law of war in-
herently limits the 2001 AUMF by declining en banc review in Al-
Bihani v. Obama.52 An earlier panel opinion in that case declared
appropriate cases, but not as part of federal law. See generally Dehn, supra note 17.
48. 548 U.S. 557, 612-13, 628 (2006) (referring to 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2006)); Detention,
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg.
57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
49. The Military Commissions Acts of 2006 and 2009 amended and supplemented this
statute. It no longer applies to military commissions convened pursuant to those Acts and
codified at Title 10, chapter 47A. See 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2012) (“This section does not apply to
a military commission established under chapter 47A of this title.”); see also Military
Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, sec. 1802, 123 Stat. 2190, 2575 (codified at 10
U.S.C § 948b (2012)); Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 4, 120 Stat.
2600, 2631.
50. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 628 (“[R]egardless of the nature of the rights conferred on
Hamdan [by the Geneva Conventions of 1949], they are ... part of the law of war [with which
10 U.S.C. § 821 requires compliance.]” (citing United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407
(1886))). “Common Article 3” refers to the identical third article of the four Geneva Conven-
tions. See GC I, supra note 5, art. 3; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3217 [hereinafter GC II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316 [hereinafter GC III]; Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516
[hereinafter GC IV]. There are 196 states party to these conventions. See INT’L COMM. OF THE
RED CROSS, STATE PARTIES TO THE FOLLOWING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND
OTHER RELATED TREATIES AS OF 14-DEC-2017, at 6 (2017), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl
[https://perma.cc/7HET-CRHJ].
51. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 635.
52. 619 F.3d 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, C.J., and Ginsburg, Henderson, Rogers, Tatel,
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“mistaken” “the premise that the war powers granted by the [2001]
AUMF ... are limited by the international laws of war.”53 
Some judges, however, chose to clarify their views on the topic. In
one concurrence, a judge noted that “international norms outside of
those explicitly incorporated into our domestic law by the political
branches are not part of the fabric of the law enforceable by federal
courts.”54 In a separate concurrence, Judge Brett Kavanaugh
argued, “[T]he 1949 Geneva Conventions are not self-executing trea-
ties and thus are not domestic U.S. law.”55 He further posited that
“absent incorporation into a statute or a self-executing treaty ...
customary-international-law principles are not part of the domestic
law of the United States that is enforceable in federal court.”56
Conceding that at least some of the law of war was relevant,
Judge Kavanaugh acknowledged, “Congress has enacted a consider-
able amount of legislation limiting wartime actions by the Executive
and military.”57 He explained, “When Congress passed the AUMF in
2001, it did so against the background of an expansive body of
domestic U.S. law prohibiting wartime actions by the Executive that
contravene American values.”58 Judge Kavanaugh cited several
federal laws that incorporate law of war limitations, including spe-
cific but limited aspects of the UCMJ, the War Crimes Act, the
federal criminal prohibition of torture, the Genocide Convention
Implementation Act, and the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.59 For
Judge Kavanaugh, “This comprehensive set of domestic U.S. laws
of war demonstrates that Congress knows how to control wartime
conduct by the Executive Branch.”60 Note that Judge Kavanuagh
assumes, without explanation or analysis, that a President may not
violate an applicable federal law incorporating the law of war.
Garland, and Griffith, JJ., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“We decline to en
banc this case to determine the role of international law-of-war principles in interpreting the
AUMF because, as the various opinions issued in the case indicate, the panel’s discussion of
that question is not necessary to the disposition of the merits.”).
53. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
54. Al-Bihani, 619 F.3d at 6 (Brown, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
55. Id. at 20 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
56. Id. at 23.
57. Id. at 28.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 28-30.
60. Id. at 28.
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Missing from Judge Kavanaugh’s lengthy opinion is an explana-
tion of the extent to which Congress has empowered courts-martial
to punish law of war violations in UCMJ Article 18. For example,
Judge Kavanaugh stated that “the UCMJ ... prohibits members of
the U.S. Armed Forces from committing murder, manslaughter, or
rape.”61 But he then ambiguously claimed, “Those provisions apply
to U.S. soldiers’ conduct in war, including both conduct directed
toward civilians and conduct directed toward enemy belligerents
outside of actual hostilities.”62 
This cryptic statement is, at best, incomplete, and at worst, clear-
ly erroneous. It appears to suggest that the crimes he listed only
apply to matters ancillary to the conduct of hostilities between con-
tending armed forces in war. This is not true. For example, if Judge
Kavanaugh meant that civilians may never be purposefully killed
in war, he is clearly incorrect. Civilians taking a direct part in the
hostilities of an armed conflict may be intentionally targeted.63 
Furthermore, Judge Kavanaugh appears to suggest that it is only
“murder” to kill enemy belligerents “outside of actual hostilities.” If
so, he apparently believes law of war violations that are an integral
part of lethal operations against enemy belligerents are not murder.
This, too, is inaccurate. For example, killing an enemy belligerent
is generally permitted in war, but doing so while feigning a status
protected by the law of war is not. Such a killing is considered
treacherous or perfidious and a war crime,64 as is reflected in the
Military Commissions Act.65 As Parts III and IV will further ex-
plain, such treacherous or perfidious killing by a person subject to
the UCMJ would be punishable either as a war crime or as murder.
In short, although Judge Kavanaugh’s vague statement may be
correct to some very limited extent, he does not explain whether or
how the law of war informs the analysis of these crimes.
No recent court, judge, government agency, or commentator has
comprehensively addressed the purpose and effect of the law of war
61. Id. at 29.
62. Id.
63. See infra notes 441-43 and accompanying text.
64. See ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 8(2)(b)(xi) (international armed conflict); id. art.
8(2)(e)(ix) (non-international armed conflict).
65. See Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, sec. 1802, 123 Stat. 2574,
2609-10 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950(t)(17) (2012)).
2018] THE LAW OF WAR 829
component of UCMJ Article 18. Article 18 states that “[g]eneral
courts-martial ... have jurisdiction to try any person who by the law
of war is subject to trial by a military tribunal and may adjudge any
punishment permitted by the law of war.”66 The precise effect of this
statutory language and its relationship to the punitive articles of
the UCMJ is not readily apparent. To the extent it authorizes the
punishment of war crimes and other law of war violations by mem-
bers of the U.S. military, however, it too is part of what Judge
Kavanaugh called the “domestic U.S. laws of war.”67 It is therefore
essential to examine the precise legal effect of Article 18.
II. MILITARY TRIBUNALS, THE COMMON LAW, AND THE PATH TO
ARTICLE 18
To better understand UCMJ Article 18 and the relationship of its
law of war component to the crimes defined in the UCMJ, a review
of the military criminal tribunals leading to its adoption is essential.
Congressional codes creating a distinct American military disciplin-
ary system have existed since 1775,68 and were first fully enacted
under the Constitution in 1806.69 They did not generally empower
courts-martial to punish offenses against the law of war until
1916,70 and did not expressly define common law and other non-
military crimes until 1950.71 Prior to that time, a military code
commonly known as the “Articles of War” regulated primarily
internal military matters, although general articles authorized
punishment of some common crimes in limited circumstances.72
66. 10 U.S.C. § 818(a) (Supp. IV 2017).
67. Al-Bihani, 619 F.3d at 28.
68. See American Articles of War of 1775, reprinted in WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW
AND PRECEDENTS 953-60 (2d ed. 1920).
69. See American Articles of War of 1806, reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note 68, at 976-
85.
70. See infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
71. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, Pub. L. No. 81-506, 64 Stat. 107, 133-43 (1950)
(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 877-934 (Supp. IV 2017)).
72. See, e.g., Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 444 (1987) (“The authority to try
soldiers for civilian crimes may be found in the much-disputed ‘general article’ of the 1776
Articles of War, which allowed court-martial jurisdiction over ‘[a]ll crimes not capital, and all
disorders and neglects which officers and soldiers may be guilty of, to the prejudice of good
order and military discipline.’” (quoting American Articles of War of 1776, Section XVIII,
Article 5, reprinted in 2 WINTHROP 1503)).
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Initially, the executive branch independently convened other
military tribunals to punish common law crimes and offenses
against the law of war in theaters of war and military occupation.73
Retracing the evolution of the subject matter and personal jurisdic-
tion of these military tribunals and their relationship to current
court-martial jurisdiction clarifies the purpose and effect of Article
18.
A. The Mexican War Tribunals
William Winthrop’s authoritative military law treatise traced the
origins of modern military tribunal jurisdiction to the occupation of
Mexico in 1847.74 There, a military tribunal called the “military
commission” tried and punished “mainly criminal offences of the
class cognizable by the civil courts in time of peace.”75 These offenses
included, among other crimes, “[a]ssassination, murder, poisoning,
rape, ... attempt[s] ..., malicious stabbing or maiming, malicious as-
sault and battery, robbery, theft, ... and the destruction, except by
order of a superior officer, of public or private property.”76 Military
commissions punished these offenses “whether committed by
Mexicans or other civilians in Mexico against individuals of the U.S.
military forces, or by such individuals against other such individu-
als or against Mexicans or civilians.”77 In other words, military
commissions exercised jurisdiction over a broad range of Anglo-
American common law crimes when committed by or against any-
one in occupied foreign territory, including members of the local
population and members of the U.S. military.
During this occupation, military commanders also established a
separate tribunal called a “council of war” to adjudicate offenses
“against the laws of war.”78 Winthrop noted this tribunal did not
significantly “differ[] from the military commission except in the
73. See generally David Glazier, Precedents Lost: The Neglected History of the Military
Commission, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 5 (2005) (retracing the inception and development of military
tribunals other than courts-marital).
74. WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 832 (2d ed. 1920).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
2018] THE LAW OF WAR 831
class of cases referred to it.”79 These cases included “[g]uerilla
warfare or [v]iolation of the [l]aws of [w]ar by Guerilleros, and
[e]nticing or [a]ttempting to entice soldiers to desert.”80 Guerilleros
were irregular fighters who engaged in armed hostilities against an
army without formal commission or authority from a sovereign
state.81
Although the Supreme Court never directly reviewed the consti-
tutional power to use these tribunals, it did favorably acknowledge
them. In Jecker v. Montgomery, the Court held that military prize
courts, also established as part of the Mexican occupation, were
unconstitutional because the Constitution and federal statutes
assigned jurisdiction over such cases to Article III federal courts.82
In dicta, however, the Court noted that the other military tribunals
in Mexico “were nothing more than the agents of the military power,
to assist it in preserving order in the conquered territory, and to
protect the inhabitants in their persons and property while it was
occupied by the American arms.”83 Thus, the Court strongly
suggested that these tribunals were a legitimate exercise of war
powers possessed by Congress and the President. Winthrop likewise
noted that these military tribunals were “an instrumentality for the
more efficient execution of war powers vested in Congress and the
power vested in the President as Commander-in-Chief in war.”84
The military tribunals in Mexico were clearly created to fill
jurisdictional gaps in the Articles of War. Because the Articles of
War primarily authorized the punishment of internal disciplinary
infractions, courts-martial lacked general authority to punish com-
mon law crimes and offenses against the law of war, particularly
when the offender was not part of the U.S. military.85 In Mexico,
therefore, where the military exercised only temporary and limited
79. Id.
80. Id. at 833.
81. Id. at 783.
82. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 498, 515 (1851). Prize cases involve adjudicating rights to ships and
cargo captured during war. See generally FRANCIS H. UPTON, THE LAW OF NATIONS AFFECTING
COMMERCE DURING WAR: WITH A REVIEW OF THE JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEEDINGS
OF PRIZE COURTS (John S. Voorhies ed., 2d ed. 1863).
83. Jecker, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 515.
84. WINTHROP, supra note 74, at 831.
85. See, e.g., Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 444 (1987) (citing American Articles
of War of 1776, Section XVIII, Article 5, reprinted in 2 WINTHROP 1503).
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U.S. sovereignty in an area where the local civil authority had been
displaced and to which the full authority of Article III courts did not
extend,86 commanders relied upon the nation’s war powers and
Anglo-American notions of common law to establish criminal tri-
bunals and to identify the crimes they could prosecute.87 Military
commissions punished common law crimes for violence that was not
a part of military operations.88 Councils of war punished enemy
offenses against the laws and customs of war,89 sometimes called the
“common law of war.”90
B. The Civil War Tribunals
Winthrop next chronicled that these separate common law
military tribunals merged into one, the military commission, during
the Civil War.91 He also noted that Congress both accepted and
employed the jurisdiction of military commissions. In 1863, Con-
gress “provided that murder, manslaughter, robbery, larceny, and
certain other specified crimes, when committed by military persons
in time of war or rebellion, should be punishable by sentence of
court-martial or military commission.”92 In 1864, Congress also
vested military commissions with jurisdiction over both spies and
guerilla fighters.93 Thus, Congress clearly recognized and endorsed
the constitutional authority of military commissions unilaterally
convened by the executive branch to try crimes and impose punish-
ment when permitted by statute or the law of war.
Congress’s understanding of the lawfulness and authority of
military commissions was contemporaneously endorsed by the
86. In Fleming v. Page, the Supreme Court clarified that although the President and
military “may invade the hostile country, and subject it to the sovereignty and authority of
the United States,” those “conquests do not enlarge the boundaries of this Union, nor extend
the operation of our institutions and laws beyond the limits before assigned to them by the
legislative power.” 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615 (1850). 
87. See WINTHROP, supra note 74, at 832.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 832-33.
90. See id. at 41.
91. Id. at 833. 
92. Id. Curiously, Winthrop notes that “or military commission” had been inadvertently
removed from the statute when inserted in the Revised Statutes. Id. at 833 n.71.
93. Id. at 833. This was likely deemed necessary to clarify that these individuals,
punishable under the international law of war, were similarly punishable in a Civil War.
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executive branch. In 1863, President Lincoln issued General Orders
100 (Orders 100), also known as the “Lieber Code,” which provided
a more detailed explanation of the customary law of war and of the
offenders and offenses subject to punishment by military tribunal.94
Orders 100 first observed that “[m]artial law is [merely] military
authority exercised in accordance with the laws and usages of
war.”95 It then declared that, during war, a hostile army suspends
and replaces a displaced civil government and its civil and criminal
laws with just military authority.96 This authority did not depend
upon comprehensive occupation of enemy territory, but merely upon
the presence of a hostile army that had displaced a local civil
authority.97 Orders 100 also clarified that martial law generally
extends not only to territory and property under military control,
94. WAR DEP’T, GENERAL ORDERS 100: INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF
THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD (1863) [hereinafter ORDERS 100], reprinted in THE LAWS OF
ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS
3 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 4th ed. 2004). For a detailed examination of the use
of military commissions in the Civil War to punish law of war violations both before and after
issuance of Orders 100, see generally Gideon M. Hart, Military Commissions and the Lieber
Code: Toward a New Understanding of the Jurisdictional Foundations of Military Commis-
sions, 203 MIL. L. REV. 1 (2010).
95. ORDERS 100, supra note 94, art. 4. 
96. Id. art. 3 (“Martial Law in a hostile country consists in the suspension, by the
occupying military authority, of the criminal and civil law, and of the domestic administration
and government in the occupied place or territory, and in the substitution of military rule and
force for the same, as well as in the dictation of general laws, as far as military necessity
requires this suspension, substitution, or dictation.”). Orders 100 qualified this vast authority
by declaring:
Military oppression is not Martial Law: it is the abuse of the power which that
law confers. As Martial Law is executed by military force, it is incumbent upon
those who administer it to be strictly guided by the principles of justice, honor,
and humanity—virtues adorning a soldier even more than other men, for the
very reason that he possesses the power of his arms against the unarmed.
Id. art. 4.
97. Id. art. 1 (“The presence of a hostile army proclaims its Martial Law.”). Its degree of
implementation, however, depended upon the relative control of the territory in question. Id.
art. 5 (“Martial Law should be less stringent in places and countries fully occupied and fairly
conquered. Much greater severity may be exercised in places or regions where actual hostil-
ities exist, or are expected and must be prepared for. Its most complete sway is allowed—even
in the commander’s own country—when face to face with the enemy, because of the absolute
necessities of the case, and of the paramount duty to defend the country against invasion. To
save the country is paramount to all other considerations.”).
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but also “to [all] persons, whether they are subjects of the enemy or
aliens to that government.”98
The elements of Orders 100 addressing the jurisdiction of military
tribunals generally followed the Mexican occupation approach.
Orders 100 first explained that “[m]ilitary jurisdiction is of two
kinds: First, that which is conferred and defined by statute; second,
that which is derived from the common law of war.”99 It continued,
“In the armies of the United States the first is exercised by courts-
martial, while cases which do not come within the ‘Rules and
Articles of War,’ or the jurisdiction conferred by statute on courts-
martial, are tried by military commissions.”100
Winthrop described the subject matter and personal jurisdiction
of military commissions in greater detail:
[T]he classes of persons who in our law may become subject to
the jurisdiction of military commissions are the following: (1)
Individuals of the enemy’s army who have been guilty of
illegitimate warfare or other offences in violation of the laws of
war; (2) Inhabitants of enemy’s country occupied and held by the
right of conquest; (3) Inhabitants of places or districts under
martial law; (4) Officers and soldiers of our own army, or persons
serving with it in the field, who, in time of war, become charge-
able with crimes or offences not cognizable, or triable, by the
criminal courts or under the Articles of war.101
In light of Orders 100 and prior practice, Winthrop’s second and
third categories of persons subject to military commission jurisdic-
tion are sufficiently clear. They included inhabitants of any place
where the U.S. military was present, engaged in hostilities or occu-
pation, and the local civil authority was displaced by the conflict.102
Winthrop’s other two categories of punishable individuals and
acts require clarification. The first included members of an enemy
armed force punishable under the laws of war.103 What currently
constitutes “illegitimate warfare or other offences in violation of the
98. Id. art. 7.
99. Id. art. 13.
100. Id. 
101. WINTHROP, supra note 74, at 838.
102. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
103. See WINTHROP, supra note 74, at 838.
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laws of war”104 will be explored in Parts III and IV. The last category
is quite expansive. Winthrop explained that it included those “ame-
nable to military commission because of criminal offences commit-
ted in places where, by reason of war and military occupation ... the
ordinary criminal courts were closed.”105 It also included those “who
became [amenable to military commission jurisdiction] by reason of
violations of the laws of war or offences of a military character, not
included among the acts made punishable by the code of Articles of
war.”106 Such offenders included not only “officers and soldiers” in
the U.S. military, but also “camp-followers and other civilians em-
ployed by the government in connection with the army in war.”107 In
other words, Winthrop clarified that during an armed conflict, a
military commission could try any member of the U.S. military and
any civilian accompanying the U.S. armed forces in the field for
either common law crimes or offenses against the law of war.108
This background reveals the motivation for the merger of common
law military tribunal jurisdiction into the military commission.
Vesting one tribunal with jurisdiction to try common law crimes as
well as offenses against the common law of war was simply more
expedient. During war, any act of violence to persons or property
might be a lawful act of war, a common crime, or a punishable act
of illegitimate warfare. To determine in which of these categories an
act of violence falls, a tribunal must clarify the context of an act of
violence and the status of the person committing it. Doing so is
necessary to  determine whether an act of violence was criminal
and, if so, the nature of the offense as common crime or offense
against the law of war.
Merging the jurisdiction of common law military tribunals in a
single forum prevented the context of an act from defeating the
narrower jurisdiction of a more specific tribunal. For example, an
individual engaging in an act of violence against a member of the
U.S. military might be a lawful enemy belligerent, a civilian, or a
guerilla fighter (also known as an unlawful enemy belligerent).109 If
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. See id. at 838-39.
109. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-36 (1942). For an analysis of this aspect of Ex parte
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a lawful belligerent, he was a prisoner of war protected from
punishment for all lawful acts of war.110 If a civilian engaged in
violence unrelated to the conflict, his violence was merely a common
crime.111 If an individual were an irregular fighter, his violence was
punishable as illegitimate warfare.112 But for the merger of military
jurisdiction, the facts presented at a trial might change the nature
of an offense from a common crime to an offence against the law of
war. Any such change would potentially defeat the jurisdiction of a
more specific common law tribunal.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte Milligan also supports
the view that military tribunals may constitutionally exercise broad
criminal jurisdiction where civil courts are closed by conflict, even
within U.S. territory.113 In Milligan, a majority of the Court held
that convening military commissions was unlawful where “the
Federal authority was always unopposed, and its courts always open
to hear criminal accusations and redress grievances.”114 The
majority clarified, “Martial law cannot arise from a threatened
invasion. The necessity must be actual and present; the invasion
real, such as effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil
administration.”115 The Court’s conclusion is consistent with the
description of martial law in Orders 100.116 Thus, during the Civil
War, all three branches of the federal government understood that
military tribunals could constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over
common law crimes and law of war offenses where local civil courts,
whether in friendly or enemy territory, were closed by actual fight-
ing or military occupation.
Quirin, see John C. Dehn, The Hamdan Case and the Application of a Municipal Offence: The
Common Law Origins of ‘Murder in Violation of the Law of War,’ 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 63, 73-
81 (2009).
110. ORDERS 100, supra note 94, art. 56 (“A prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for
being a public enemy.”); see also id. art. 57 (“So soon as a man is armed by a sovereign govern-
ment and takes the soldier’s oath of fidelity, he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, or other
warlike acts are not individual crimes or offenses.”).
111. See id. art. 6 (“All civil and penal law shall continue to take its usual course in the
enemy’s places and territories under Martial Law.”).
112. See id. arts. 83-85; see also WINTHROP, supra note 74, at 838.
113. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866).
114. Id. at 121.
115. Id. at 127.
116. See ORDERS 100, supra note 94, arts. 1-7.
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C. Toward the Uniform Code of Military Justice
The personal and subject matter jurisdiction of military tribu-
nals continued to evolve after the Civil War. In 1874, near the end
of the Reconstruction Era,117 Congress amended the Articles of
War.118 It added a new article that, in time of war, provided for the
punishment of various common law capital crimes by courts-martial
rather than military commission.119 It appears Congress intended to
transfer jurisdiction over capital crimes to courts-martial, which
provided for greater procedural regularity and congressional con-
trol.120 
This amendment began a trend toward expanding court-martial
jurisdiction to include common criminal offenses. Congress substan-
tially amended the Articles of War again in 1916.121 This edition
included the statutory antecedents of UCMJ Articles 18 and 21.122
117. This Article will not address the Reconstruction Acts or American military practices
in the former Confederate states during Reconstruction because those precedents are constitu-
tionally suspect and, in any event, unnecessary for understanding the issues addressed in this
Article. For a review and analysis, see WINTHROP, supra note 74, at 855-62. See generally
Detlev F. Vagts, Military Commissions: The Forgotten Reconstruction Chapter, 23 AM. U. INT’L
L. REV. 231 (2008).
118. American Articles of War of 1874, reprinted in WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND
PRECEDENTS 986-96 (2d ed. 1920).
119. Id. at 990 (“In time of war, insurrection, or rebellion, larceny, robbery, burglary, arson,
mayhem, manslaughter, murder, assault and battery with an intent to kill, wounding, by
shooting or stabbing, with an intent to commit murder, rape, or assault and battery with an
intent to commit rape, shall be punishable by the sentence of a general court-martial, when
committed by persons in the military service of the United States, and the punishment in any
such case shall not be less than the punishment provided, for the like offense, by the laws of
the State, Territory, or district in which such offense may have been committed.”).
120. According to Winthrop, “In the absence of any statute or regulation governing the
proceedings of military commissions, the same are commonly conducted according to the rules
and forms governing courts-martial. These war-courts are indeed more summary in their
action than are the courts held under the Articles of war, and ... their proceedings ... will not
be rendered illegal by the omission of details required upon trials by courts-martial.”
WINTHROP, supra note 74, at 841 (footnotes omitted); see also In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 17-
20, 23 (1946) (holding procedural aspects of the Articles of War did not apply to military
commissions and “that the commission’s rulings on evidence and on the mode of conducting
these proceedings against petitioner are not reviewable by the courts, but only by the
reviewing military authorities”).
121. Articles of War, Pub. L. No. 64-242, 39 Stat. 619 (1916), amended by Act of June 4,
1920, Pub. L. No. 66-242, 41 Stat. 759 (repealed 1950).
122. See NAT’L MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE arts. 18
cmt., 21 cmt. (1949) [hereinafter UCMJ COMMENTARY].
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Article 12, the antecedent of UCMJ Article 18, provided, “General
courts-martial shall have power to try any person subject to military
law for any crime or offense made punishable by these articles and
any other person who by the law of war is subject to trial by military
tribunals.”123 Article 15, the antecedent of UCMJ Article 21, clarified
that “conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial shall not be con-
strued as depriving military commissions ... of concurrent jurisdic-
tion [over] offenders or offenses that by the law of war may be
lawfully triable by such military commissions.”124 From this lan-
guage and in light of earlier events, it is clear that Congress ex-
panded court-martial jurisdiction to encompass all offenders and
offenses punishable by military commission for common law crimes
or offenses against the law of war. 
The executive branch clearly shared this expansive view of the
jurisdiction of courts-martial under the 1916 Articles of War. The
1918 Manual for Courts-Martial, issued by authority of the Pres-
ident,125 explained that these new articles made “[t]he jurisdiction
of the general court-martial ... concurrent with that of the military
commission and other war tribunals in the trial of offenses against
the laws of war.”126
To ensure that courts-martial could exercise the full extent of
personal jurisdiction exercised by military commissions, Congress
also modified the personal jurisdiction of courts-martial. The 1874
Articles governed “[t]he armies of the United States,”127 which were
defined to include only appointed officers and enlisted men.128
Article 63 then stated, “All retainers to the camp, and all persons
serving with the armies of the United States in the field, though not
enlisted soldiers, are to be subject to orders, according to the rules
and discipline of war.”129 The military interpreted this provision to
123. Art. 12, 39 Stat. at 652.
124. Art. 15, 39 Stat. at 653.
125. See, e.g., Gregory E. Maggs, Judicial Review of the Manual for Courts-Martial, 160
MIL. L. REV. 96, 100-01, 132-35 (1999) (articulating current statutory and probable
constitutional bases for the President’s authority to promulgate Manuals for Courts-Martial).
126. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, intro., ¶ 6 (1918) [hereinafter 1918
MCM]. Interestingly, Article 16 provided that officers could only be tried by courts-martial,
and thus, without this expansion of courts-martial jurisdiction, no jurisdiction to try officers
for law of war violations would have existed. 39 Stat. at 653.
127. American Articles of War of 1874, supra note 118,  pmbl., at 986.
128. Id. arts. 1-2, at 986.
129. Id. art. 63, at 991.
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apply only during war,130 and found it to be ambiguous with respect
to whether Congress intended to subject such persons to the juris-
diction of courts-martial.131 To clarify these matters, Article 2(d) of
the 1916 Articles extended courts-martial jurisdiction to:
All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or
serving with the armies of the United States without the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States, and in time of war
all such retainers and persons accompanying or serving with the
armies of the United States in the field, both within and without
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, though not
otherwise subject to these articles.132
Not only were all civilians accompanying the military abroad made
statutorily subject to court-martial jurisdiction, so too were those
accompanying the military in the field during war regardless of lo-
cation.
These changes suggest that Congress considered different consti-
tutional issues. The provision relating to general extraterritorial
jurisdiction was likely due to the limited availability of Article III or
other U.S. criminal courts abroad.133 The latter provision, extending
court-martial jurisdiction to civilians in time of war regardless of
location, was clearly based in the federal war powers,134 like the
jurisdiction of military commissions preceding them.135 Although
Congress later amended the Articles of War in various respects,
these aspects of the 1916 Articles remained substantially un-
changed until incorporated into the UCMJ.136
130. Edmund M. Morgan, Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Non-Military Persons Under the
Articles of War, 4 MINN. L. REV. 79, 90 (1920) (noting application of this provision “was strictly
limited to the time of war”).
131. See id. (noting that the military’s “settled construction of [Article 63] was that [it]
subjected the civilians designated ... to the jurisdiction of courts-martial” but that Congress
did not officially give “legislative sanction” to this practice until its passage of 1916 Articles).
132. Articles of War, Pub. L. No. 64-242, art. 2(d), 39 Stat. 619, 651, amended by Act of
June 4, 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-242, 41 Stat. 759 (repealed 1950).
133. See Morgan, supra note 130, at 94-95, 95 n.68 (explaining the jurisdictional gap this
provision was designed to cure).
134. See generally id. at 89-97 (analyzing wartime case law surrounding these provisions).
For an analysis of Supreme Court cases supporting this characterization, see Dehn, supra
note 17, at 2142-46, 2149-52.
135. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Act of June 4, 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-242, arts. 2(d), 12, 15, 41 Stat. 759, 787,
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D. The Uniform Code of Military Justice
When Congress enacted the UCMJ in 1950, it refined the scope
of court-martial jurisdiction. The substance of Articles of War 2(d),
12, and 15 was placed in UCMJ Articles 2(10)-(12), 18, and 21,
respectively.137 Relevant to this analysis, Article 18 read, 
[G]eneral courts-martial shall have jurisdiction to try persons
subject to this code for any offense made punishable by this code
.... General courts-martial shall also have jurisdiction to try any
person who by the law of war is subject to trial by a military
tribunal and may adjudge any punishment permitted by the law
of war.138 
Article 21 of the UCMJ was identical to Article of War 15.139 Article
2(10) preserved court-martial jurisdiction over “all persons serving
with or accompanying an armed force in the field” “[i]n time of
war.”140 Article 2(11)-(12) refined the circumstances under which
Congress sought to extend court-martial jurisdiction to areas out-
side U.S. territory in circumstances not involving war,141 and were
later deemed unconstitutional.142
The UCMJ also codified many common law crimes, including
murder, rape, assault, burglary, and others, in addition to offenses
against military discipline.143 Congress also made the UCMJ,
including the new punitive articles codifying common law crimes,
“applicable in all places.”144 For the first time, therefore, courts-
martial had statutory jurisdiction over common criminal offenses by
789-90 (repealed 1950); Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-759, secs. 202, 209, 62
Stat. 604, 628-30 (amending unrelated aspects of Article 12 only).
137. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Pub. L. No. 81-506, arts. 2(10)-(12), 18, 21, 64 Stat.
107, 109, 114-15 (1950) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 802(a)(10)-(12), 821 (2012); 10
U.S.C. § 818 (Supp. IV 2017)).
138. Id. art. 18.
139. Compare art. 15, 41 Stat. at 790, with art. 21, 64 Stat. at 115.
140. Art. 2(10), 64 Stat. at 109.
141. Id. art. 2(11)-(12); see also UCMJ COMMENTARY, supra note 122, art. 2 cmt. (explaining
sources and purposes of these articles).
142. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 38-41 (1957) (holding trial and punishment by courts-
martial of military spouses accompanying service members abroad in times of peace uncon-
stitutional).
143. Arts. 77-134, 64 Stat. at 133-43.
144. Id. art. 5.
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members of the military wherever and whenever committed, even
when unrelated to a war or other contingency operation.145
The exact scope of courts-martial jurisdiction over law of war
matters under the UCMJ was not initially made clear to Congress.
During committee hearings on the UCMJ, court-martial jurisdiction
over offenders and offenses punishable by military tribunal under
the law of war was a point of confusion.146 Committee members
sought clarification concerning whether courts-martial trying such
individuals would be subject to statutory limits on court-martial
punishment.147 Inconsistent answers were given. One witness stated
that when courts-martial exercise jurisdiction as permitted by the
laws of war, they act as “military tribunals” rather than courts-
martial.148 This may suggest that statutory constraints upon courts-
martial, such as limitations on punishment, would not necessarily
apply. Later, though, the same witness stated that such limits
145. This development resulted in a significant expansion of court-martial jurisdiction
when those crimes were committed within the United States in times of peace. Solorio v.
United States explains the effect of this development on the jurisdiction of courts-martial in
domestic territory not affected by an armed conflict. 483 U.S. 435, 440-42, 449-51 (1987)
(explaining origins of development of “service connection” test once used to limit court-marital
jurisdiction, which the Court abandoned).
146. The confusion is undoubtedly in part because the witnesses had helped prepare a
report with text and commentary on the proposed Code that omitted any reference to the law
of war element of Article 18. See UCMJ COMMENTARY, supra note 122, art. 18 cmt.
147. Uniform Code of Military Justice: Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before the H. Subcomm. No.
1 of the H. Comm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong. 958-62 (1949) (statement of Felix Larkin,
Assistant Gen. Counsel, Office of the Secretary of Def.).
148. The relevant discussion follows:
Mr. BROOKS: ... Now I want to ask one more question before we finish the
paragraph. I may be a little confused about it, but it seems to me that last
sentence is a catch-all that will just about cover anything. Perhaps, historically,
it was worded all right.
Mr. LARKIN: It is designed to enable the courts martial, when it is acting not
as a courts martial but as a mi1itary tribunal, to follow the laws of war.
Mr. BROOKS: Does it not nullify what we just said above there?
Mr. LARKIN: No, because it is used as a military tribunal in only a very
limited number of cases, usually a case like spying or treason.
Mr. BROOKS: But it says “any person who by the law of war is subject to
trial.” Would that not include any man in any branch of the service?
Mr. LARKIN: Well, any man in any branch of service, I suppose who violated
the law of war would be triable by a military tribunal or a courts martial which
is not acting as a courts martial but a military tribunal.
Id. at 961.
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would nevertheless apply.149 Another witness suggested they would
not.150 One witness claimed that the category of cases encompassed
by Article 18 would likely be limited to spies or treason.151 And still
another suggested that U.S. service members would never be tried
under the laws of war rather than a punitive article of the UCMJ.152
No clarification was given to explain why this would be the case.
Given the diversity of views presented, the committee’s understand-
ing of Article 18 is unclear.
Despite this confusion, the 1951 Manual for Courts-Martial dem-
onstrated that the executive branch understood Article 18 to be as
broad as both its language and origins suggest. It stated:
[C]ourts-martial have power to try any person subject to the
code for any offense made punishable by the code. In addition
they have power to try any person who by the law of war is
subject to trial by military tribunal for any crime or offense
against the law of war and for any crime or offense against the
law of territory occupied as an incident of war or belligerency
whenever the local civil authority is superseded in whole or in
149. The relevant discussion follows:
Mr. BROOKS: I will not make it a point, but it does just seem to me that that
covers everybody and it renders null the preceding provision which limits the
type of punishment. That is not true, is it?
Mr. LARKIN: I do not think so, Mr. Chairman.
Id.
150. The relevant discussion follows:
Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED: Mr. Larkin, I do not want to delay—I know we have
to cover a lot of ground and everything—but I am not entirely familiar with the
difference between military tribunal and a courts martial. 
Would it take you too long to tell us just a little bit about that?
Mr.GAVIN. Who sits on the military tribunal?
Mr. LARKIN. Well, they vary. Perhaps Colonel Dinsmore can explain that
difference.
Colonel DINSMORE: That ordinarily, Mr. deGraffenried, takes the form of a
military commission. It is appointed in the same manner and perhaps by the
same authority as the courts martial. It is not sitting as a courts martial,
however. It is sitting as a military tribunal to administer the laws of war.
Now, I would like to say at the same time, in response to a suggestion that
has been made, I conceive of no situation in which military personnel of our own
forces would be tried under the laws of war as distinguished from the Articles
of War we are writing.
Id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
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part by the military authority of the occupying power. The law
of occupied territory includes the local criminal law as adopted
or modified by competent authority, and the proclamations,
ordinances, regulations, or orders promulgated by competent
authority of the occupying power.153
Thus, the executive branch understood UCMJ court-martial juris-
diction to be equivalent to the broad jurisdiction of common law
military tribunals under the Articles of War. A court-martial could
try any case that, under the law of war, may have been tried by a
military commission or other military tribunal.154 It is therefore
essential to more carefully examine the text of Article 18 and deter-
mine its substantive scope and legal effect.
III. THE SCOPE AND LEGAL EFFECT OF ARTICLE 18
Between the 1916 Articles of War, which contained the Article 18
antecedent, and 1950, when the UCMJ adopted Article 18, the Unit-
ed States participated in two world wars. Its participation in the
Second World War included the trial and punishment of 142 Ger-
mans for offenses against the law of war by U.S. military tribunals
in occupied Germany.155 Military tribunals also prosecuted U.S. ci-
vilians for violations of German penal law in occupied Germany.156
During this period the United States also participated in the de-
velopment and adoption of several new law of war treaties. Relevant
treaties included what is known as the 1925 Gas Protocol157 and the
153. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES pt. IV, ¶ 14a (1951) [hereinafter 1951
MCM].
154. See id. pt. I, ¶ 2 (“Military jurisdiction is exercised by a belligerent occupying enemy
territory (military government); by a government temporarily governing the civil population
of a locality through its military forces, without the authority of written law, as necessity may
require (martial law); by a government in the execution of that branch of the municipal law
which regulates its military establishment (military law); and by a government with respect
to offenses against the law of war.”).
155. See TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE NU-
REMBURG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 241 (1949). Although
185 individuals were indicted, only 177 were tried (with 142 convicted and 35 acquitted). Id.
Eight either committed suicide or were “severed.” Id.
156. See, e.g., Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 342-43 (1952).
157. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571.
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1929 Geneva Conventions,158 which were later replaced and expand-
ed upon by the 1949 Geneva Conventions (ratified by the United
States in 1955).159 Despite these many developments, the law of war
component of both court-martial and military tribunal jurisdiction
remained fundamentally unchanged from the 1916 Articles of War
until the Military Commissions Acts of 2006 and 2009.160 From 1950
to the present, states including the United States have developed
and adopted numerous additional law of war treaties,161 and many
customary law of war norms have either been modified or further
clarified.162
These many developments raise at least three important issues
of statutory interpretation with respect to UCMJ Article 18. The
first is the precise legal effect of UCMJ Article 18. Is it merely
jurisdictional or does it effectively create substantive criminal of-
fenses? The second entails identifying precisely to what the term
“law of war” refers. The third involves identifying the individuals
and conduct punishable under the relevant “law of war.” This Part
examines each of these issues in turn, and I first argue that Article
18 not only assigns jurisdiction over a general class of offenders and
acts but also creates municipal crimes punishing all acts in the
context of an armed conflict for which the law of war permits
punishment by military tribunal. Second, it concludes the term “law
of war” refers to all treaty and customary norms applicable to a spe-
cific armed conflict at the time an alleged punishable act occurred
rather than only the law of war norms existing at the time the term
“law of war” was adopted. Third, it shows that Article 18 authorizes
punishment of: (1) acts denominated war crimes by international
law; and (2) any acts by or on behalf of an enemy of the United
States for which the law of war removes legal protection and per-
mits punishment. The punishment of other law of war violations by
158. Convention Relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat.
2021; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies
in the Field, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2074.
159. See GC I, supra note 5; GC II, supra note 50; GC III, supra note 50; GC IV, supra note
50.
160. See supra note 49.
161. The International Committee of the Red Cross identifies twenty-seven “main” law of
war treaties. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 50, at 1.
162. An example is the clarification of war crimes in non-international armed conflict. See
infra note 217 and accompanying text.
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U.S. forces and any civilians accompanying them, as well as the
relationship of such violations to the punitive articles of the UCMJ,
are addressed in Part IV.
A. Parsing the Text and Its Effect
1. Article 18
The precise legal effect of vesting courts-martial with “jurisdiction
to try any person who by the law of war is subject to trial by a
military tribunal and [to] adjudge any punishment permitted by the
law of war,”163 has not been fully addressed by military courts,164
commentators,165 or the Law of War Manual.166 
The text of Article 18 might be interpreted in at least two ways.
First, it might be construed as purely jurisdictional, conferring au-
thority only to adjudicate acts denominated as criminal by the law
of war. Second, the text may be read not only to vest jurisdiction but
also to effectively create substantive criminal offenses punishing
any act for which the law of war permits punishment by military
tribunal.
Determining which of these potential interpretations is correct
has significant implications for subject matter jurisdiction. If Article
163. 10 U.S.C. § 818(a) (Supp. IV 2017).
164. Cases discussing the scope of law of war jurisdiction deal almost exclusively with mil-
itary commissions. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 566 (2006); Madsen v.
Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 342-43 (1952); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 5 (1946); Ex parte Quirin,
317 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1942); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 107 (1866). One exception is
United States v. Schultz, in which the Court of Military Appeals only generally explains court-
martial jurisdiction under 1916 Articles of War 12 in occupied Japan. 4 C.M.R. 104, 111-13
(C.M.A. 1952); see also id. at 111 (concluding courts-martial in occupied territory have
jurisdiction over “persons subject to the military law and ... persons subject to the law of war”
without explaining the full scope of the latter category); see also United States v. Burney, 21
C.M.R. 98, 115-17, 126-27 (C.M.A. 1956) (examining only when civilians are subject to
jurisdiction of courts-martial in time of war, citing similar reported cases). 
165. See, e.g., Major Jan E. Aldykiewicz & Major Geoffrey S. Corn, Authority to Court-
Martial Non-U.S. Military Personnel for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed During Internal Armed Conflicts, 167 MIL. L. REV. 74, 78-82 (2001) (con-
cluding courts-martial may punish war crimes but not full scope of statutory language); Major
Mynda G. Ohman, Integrating Title 18 War Crimes into Title 10: A Proposal to Amend the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 57 AIR FORCE L. REV. 1, 6 (2005) (discussing only
jurisdiction over war crimes by U.S. service members).
166. See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 38, at 1120-21.
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18 is only jurisdictional, then international law must clearly and
affirmatively denominate an act as a crime before it may be pun-
ished by courts-martial.167 Until states collectively and affirmatively
denominate an act as criminal, it is not an international crime.168
Generally speaking, states have an affirmative international legal
obligation to investigate and prosecute international war crimes.169
If Article 18 grants jurisdiction and also effectively creates substan-
tive offenses when the law of war permits, then the subject matter
jurisdiction of courts-martial is clearly much broader.170 This is
because the law of war permits the punishment of many acts
without denominating those acts to be crimes,171 which then allows
states discretion to determine how to punish or otherwise suppress
such acts.
It seems clear that Article 18 should be construed to permit
military tribunals to punish any act for which punishment by
military tribunal is permitted under the law of war. Its text requires
reference to the law of war to identify offenders and acts punishable
by military tribunal and also empowers courts-martial to “adjudge
any punishment permitted by the law of war.”172 Granting a crimin-
al tribunal general power to punish when international law permits
rather than requires it necessarily entails the creation of a munici-
pal criminal offense for every such act. If international law does not
provide a criminal sanction, any such sanction must come from
domestic law. Vesting municipal courts with the power to punish
international law violations therefore effectively creates municipal
167. See, e.g., Jens David Ohlin, The Common Law of War, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 493, 502
(2016). International law is created by the express or implied consent of sovereign states. See
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, ¶ 1, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031; Dehn,
supra note 17, at 2116.
168. This is known as the legality principle, which prohibits the punishment of conduct not
denominated as criminal at the time it occurred. See, e.g., ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 22,
¶ 1. The absence of international norms clearly authorizing individual criminal punishment
was a primary objection to post-World War II international military tribunals. See, e.g.,
TAYLOR, supra note 155, at 218.
169. See ICC Statute, supra note 3, pmbl.
170. I have elsewhere argued that Article 18 preserves an Anglo-American common-law
approach to punishing acts for which the law of war removes or does not provide immunity
or other protection. See generally Dehn, supra note 109.
171. See infra Part III.C.
172. 10 U.S.C. § 818(a) (Supp. IV 2017) (emphasis added).
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crimes. This becomes clearer by considering other statutes that
create domestic authority to punish law of war violations.
A prime example of a statute broadly creating not only personal
and subject matter jurisdiction but also U.S. municipal criminal law
of war offenses is the War Crimes Act. The War Crimes Act delimits
personal jurisdiction: it applies to acts “whether inside or outside
the United States”: but only when “the person committing such war
crime or the victim of such war crime is a member of the Armed
Forces of the United States or a national of the United States.”173
The War Crimes Act vests Article III federal courts with jurisdiction
to punish “war crimes,” including grave breaches of the 1949
Geneva Conventions and other serious law of war violations.174
Although the 1949 Geneva Conventions require high contracting
parties to impose a “penal sanction[ ]” for grave breaches, they do
not label those acts to be “international crimes.”175 Although grave
beaches are now frequently called “international war crimes,” states
must logically implement treaty obligations to punish individuals 
in their municipal criminal law. The international legal norms
incorporated by reference in the War Crimes Act become municipal
crimes.176 The War Crimes Act therefore establishes and delineates
not only subject matter and personal jurisdiction but also municipal
federal crimes enforcing the law of war. 177
It is appropriate to construe Article 18 similarly. The text of
Article 18 clearly grants both subject matter and personal jurisdic-
tion over the “offenders” and “offenses” punishable by military
tribunal.178 Additionally, by vesting authority to punish any act
when permitted by the law of war, it also effectively creates do-
mestic crimes for each such act. Whenever the law of war permits
punishment of an offender and act by military tribunal, Article 18
173. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(a)-(b) (2012). This does not fully satisfy the treaty obligation to
impose a penal sanction regardless of the nationality of the offender or victim. See GC I, supra
note 5, art. 49; GC II, supra note 50, art. 50; GC III, supra note 50, art. 129; GC IV, supra note
50, art. 146.
174. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(a), (d).
175. GC I, supra note 5, art. 49; GC II, supra note 50, art. 50; GC III, supra note 50, art.
129; GC IV, supra note 50, art. 146.
176. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c).
177. See id.
178. See 10 U.S.C. § 818 (Supp. IV 2017).
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empowers courts-martial to punish it.179 It thereby incorporates all
such acts by reference and establishes municipal crimes.
Commentary in the 1951 Manual for Courts-Martial supports this
understanding of Article 18. It states, “In the case of a person sub-
ject to trial by general court-martial by the law of war (see Art. 18),
the [criminal] Charge should be: ‘Violation of the Law of War.’”180
Note that this provision does not refer only to war crimes defined by
international law or grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, but
instead permits charging any law of war violation.181 A similar
comment appeared in later Manuals for Courts-Martial,182 and was
later included in the comments to Rule for Courts-Martial 307,
where it remains today.183 Thus, it appears that the executive
branch has long understood that Article 18 not only vests personal
and subject matter jurisdiction but also creates municipal offenses
for law of war violations that may be charged by courts-martial. 
One objection to this view might be that the Supreme Court has
generally treated the “customary” or “common” law of war as entire-
ly exogenous to, rather than part of, U.S. law.184 This would suggest
that Article 18 is only jurisdictional and does not create municipal
crimes. The precise issue, however, is not how to characterize the
law of war generally, but rather its implementation in the UCMJ
and punishment by courts-martial. At least one Supreme Court Jus-
tice has noted that decisions by U.S. officials to implement the law
of war in a specific way are domestic policy choices that create fed-
eral law.185 The author of a seminal article on this topic, Professor
179. See id.
180. 1951 MCM, supra note 153, app. 6b, ¶ 12.
181. Id.
182. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES app. 6b, ¶ 12 (1968) [hereinafter 1968
MCM]; see also MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES app. 6b, ¶ 12 (rev. ed. 1969)
[hereinafter 1969 MCM].
183. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 307(c)(2) cmt. (D) (2012)
[hereinafter 2012 MCM]; see also MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M.
307(c)(2) cmt. (D) (1998) [hereinafter 1998 MCM]; MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED
STATES, R.C.M. 307(c)(2) cmt. (D) (1994) [hereinafter 1994 MCM]; MANUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 307(c)(2) cmt. (D) (1984) [hereinafter 1984 MCM].
184. See generally Dehn, supra note 17; Ohlin, supra note 167.
185. In his dissent in New York Life Insurance Co. v. Hendren, Justice Joseph Bradley
stated, “[I]n many things that prima facie belong to international law, the government will
adopt its own regulations: such as the extent to which intercourse shall be prohibited; how
far property of enemies shall be confiscated; what shall be deemed contraband.” 92 U.S. 286,
288 (1875) (Bradley, J., dissenting). He continued:
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Richard Baxter, also understood some law of war punishment
necessarily occurs under a state’s municipal law, including its
“military common law.”186
It seems clear, then, that vesting a domestic tribunal with the
power to punish offenders and acts when “permitted” by the law of
war incorporates all such circumstances as crimes in U.S. law. This
conclusion also finds additional support in the case law related to
the “concurrent jurisdiction” of Article 21.
2. Instructive Article 21 Case Law
The case law interpreting Article 21 (and its antecedent statute,
Article of War 15) clarifies that while the sources of jurisdiction to
punish law of war violations and other crimes by military tribunal
are the Constitution and international law, the offenses for which
it authorizes punishment are municipal in nature. Although the Su-
preme Court has expressed conflicting views about the legal under-
pinnings and effect of UCMJ Article 21, both the executive branch
and the Supreme Court now appear to share this view. 
The long-standing executive branch view has been that the law
of war is one source of the jurisdiction for military tribunals other
than courts-martial. This is reflected in Orders 100,187 Winthrop’s
treatise,188 almost a century of Manuals for Courts-Martial,189 and
All this only shows that the laws which the citizens of the United States are to
obey in regard to intercourse with a nation or people with which they are at war
are laws of the United States. These laws will be the unwritten international
law, if nothing be adopted or announced to the contrary; or the express reg-
ulations of the government, when it sees fit to make them. But in both cases it
is the law of the United States for the time being, whether written or unwritten.
Id. This view supports the notion that punishing an individual is properly considered domestic
law, whether expressly defined in a statute or imposed by the executive when permitted by
international law.
186. See Richard R. Baxter, So-Called ‘Unprivileged Belligerency’: Spies, Guerrillas, and
Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 323, 340 (1951); see also infra note 196 and accompanying
text.
187. ORDERS 100, supra note 94, art. 13; see also supra notes 99-100 and accompanying
text.
188. WINTHROP, supra note 74, 836-37.
189. See 2012 MCM, supra note 183, pt. I, pmbl. (“The sources of military jurisdiction
include the Constitution and international law.”); MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED
STATES pt. I, pmbl. (2008) [hereinafter 2008 MCM] (same); MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL,
UNITED STATES pt. I, pmbl. (2000) [hereinafter 2000 MCM] (same); 1998 MCM, supra note
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other military manuals.190 This view is also consistent with the
historical origins of these tribunals and with post-Second World
War events, discussed earlier.191 
The executive branch also believed, however, that the war powers
conferred by the Constitution are also a source of authority. As
Winthrop stated, “[I]n general, it is those provisions of the Constitu-
tion which empower Congress to ‘declare war’ and ‘raise armies,’
and which, in authorizing the initiation of war, authorize the
employment of all necessary and proper agencies for its due pros-
ecution, from which this tribunal derives its original sanction.”192
Put differently, congressional authorization to engage in war confers
constitutional authority to use all measures that are consistent with
the law of war and any specifically applicable domestic law.193 This
authority has long included the power to create and use military
tribunals when permitted by the law of war.
The Supreme Court has not been consistent in its view of either
the international or the domestic legal authority for using military
tribunals other than courts-martial. It initially suggested Article 15
of the 1916 Articles of War, the antecedent of Article 21, was an
exercise of Congress’s power “[t]o define and punish ... Offenses
against the Law of Nations” rather than the war powers.194 This
characterization is highly suspect. Recall that Article 15, and now
UCMJ Article 21, merely clarifies that vesting identical jurisdiction
183, pt. I, pmbl. (same); 1994 MCM, supra note 183, pt. I, pmbl.(same); 1984 MCM, supra note
183, pt. I, pmbl. (same); 1969 MCM, supra note 182, ch. 1, ¶ 1 (same); 1968 MCM, supra note
182, ch. 1, ¶ 1 (same); 1951 MCM, supra note 153, ch. 1, ¶ 1 (same); see also MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES § 1(1)-(2)(a) (1921) (asserting source of military jurisdiction
rests in Constitution’s assignment of war powers and includes punishment permitted by the
law of war); 1918 MCM, supra note 126, ch. 1, § 1(1)-(2)(a) (similar language).
190. See, e.g., WAR DEP’T, RULES OF LAND WARFARE 129-32 (1914) (differentiating pun-
ishment of individuals under law of war and domestic law); see also, e.g., DEP’T OF THE ARMY,
FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 176-83 (1956) (similar); WAR DEP’T, FIELD
MANUAL 27-10, RULES OF LAND WARFARE 86-89 (1940) (similar).
191. See supra Parts II.A-B; supra note 155 and accompanying text.
192. WINTHROP, supra note 74, at 831 (emphasis added).
193. See John C. Dehn, The Commander-in-Chief and the Necessities of War: A Conceptual
Framework, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 599, 626-38 (2011)
194. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (emphasis added); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942)
(“Congress ... has thus exercised its authority to define and punish offenses against the law
of nations by sanctioning, within constitutional limitations, the jurisdiction of military
commissions to try persons for offenses which, according to the rules and precepts of the law
of nations, and more particularly the law of war, are cognizable by such tribunals.”).
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in courts-martial “shall not be construed as depriving military
commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals of concur-
rent jurisdiction in respect of offenders or offenses that by the law
of war may be lawfully triable by such” tribunals.195 In other words,
the text of Article 15 preserved previously existing jurisdiction,
which the executive branch has consistently viewed as based in the
war powers and law of war. The text of Article 21 cannot fairly be
read to create the tribunals, to affirmatively grant jurisdiction, or to
delegate legislative power to prescribe and punish offenses. As the
Court later explained in Ex parte Quirin, Congress chose to recog-
nize and employ “the system of common law applied by military
tribunals.”196
The Supreme Court later clarified that international law and the
nation’s war powers are the sources of legal authority for military
tribunals. In the cases of Madsen v. Kinsella and In re Yamashita,
the Court found Judge Advocate General of the Army Enoch Crow-
der’s congressional testimony regarding Article 15 to be authorita-
tive.197 General Crowder stated that Article 15 was intended to
preserve preexisting legal authority rather than to create new
tribunals in domestic law.198 That legal authority was consistently
understood to be the Constitution’s war powers and the law of war.
195. See Articles of War, Pub. L. No. 64-242, 39 Stat. 619, 653 (1916) (emphasis added),
amended by Act of June 4, 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-242, 41 Stat. 759 (repealed 1950); see also 10
U.S.C. § 821 (2012) (similar language).
196. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 30.
197. See Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 353-54 (1952) (citing In re Yamashita, 327 U.S.
1, 67-71 (1946)).
198. Crowder’s relevant testimony was as follows:
Article 15 is new. We have included in article 2 as subject to military law a num-
ber of persons who are also subject to trial by military commission. A military
commission is our common-law war court. It has no statutory existence, though
it is recognized by statute law. As long as the articles embraced them in the
designation “persons subject to military law,” and provided that they might be
tried by court-martial, I was afraid that, having made a special provision for
their trial by court-martial, it might be held that the provision operated to
exclude trials by military commission and other war courts; so this new article
was introduced
....
It just saves to these war courts the jurisdiction they now have and makes it
a concurrent jurisdiction with courts-martial, so that the military commander
in the field in time of war will be at liberty to employ either form of court that
happens to be convenient.
S. REP. NO. 64-130, at 40 (1916).
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It thus seems clear that all branches of government once clearly
understood that the power to impose punishment by military
tribunals other than courts-martial was based in the law of war and
war powers of the government rather than the Offenses Clause or
other congressional powers.199 Indeed, the Supreme Court has re-
peatedly held that military commissions are not Article III “courts”
and do not exercise the judicial power of the United States.200 It has
also clearly held that Military Commissions are not subject to the
requirements of the Fifth or Sixth Amendments.201
These dual sources of authority for the tribunals do not alter the
domestic nature of the crimes charged and punishment imposed.
Although the authority to impose individual punishment may stem
from international law, it cannot be properly said that U.S. military
tribunals impose a criminal sanction created by international law.
The law of war did not affirmatively require criminal sanctions for
some violations until the grave breach provisions of the 1949
Geneva Conventions. Military commissions punishing common law
crimes, illegitimate acts of warfare, and law of war violations long
predated this development and therefore could only have imposed
punishment under municipal sovereign authority. When established
by collective sovereign action, international tribunals impose
punishment by directly applying international law; individual states
199. See Al-Bahlul v. United States, 840 F.3d 757, 761 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (per curiam) (“[T]he war powers clauses in Article I, Section
8—including the Declare War Clause and the Captures Clause, together with the Necessary
and Proper Clause—supply Congress with ample authority to establish military commissions
and make offenses triable by military commission. And the Declare War Clause and the other
war powers clauses in Article I do not refer to international law or otherwise impose
international law as a constraint on Congress’s authority to make offenses triable by military
commission.”), rev’g 792 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, No. 16-1307, 2017 WL 1550817
(U.S. 2017); Dehn, supra note 17, at 2143.
200. Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1948) (per curiam) (holding tribunal in
occupied Japan convened on behalf of allies is “not a tribunal of the United States”); In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 8 (1946) (“[T]he military tribunals which Congress has sanctioned by
the Articles of War are not courts whose rulings and judgments are made subject to review
by this Court.”); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 39 (“[M]ilitary tribunals ... are not courts in the
sense of the Judiciary Article.”); Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 251 (1863) (“[A]
military commission [is not] a court within the meaning of the 14th section of the Judiciary
Act of 1789.”); Jecker v. Montgomery, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 498, 515 (1851) (“The courts,
established or sanctioned in Mexico during the war by the commanders of the American
forces, were nothing more than the agents of the military power.... They were not courts of the
United States.”).
201. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 40.
2018] THE LAW OF WAR 853
typically do so by exercising domestic jurisdiction and applying
municipal criminal law.202 In the United States, the authority of
military tribunals to impose punishments permitted or required by
the law of war is therefore properly understood as imposing
punishment under municipal U.S. law.203
The breadth and nature of acts punishable by military tribunal
under the law of war also reveal the municipal nature of crimes
charged and punishment imposed. For example, Articles 18 and 21
also authorize the trial and punishment of violations of the criminal
laws of an occupied foreign territory as well as military-created
security measures. This is because Article 64 of the 1949 Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War provides that a military tribunal may enforce “[t]he penal laws
of the occupied territory,” which “shall remain in force, with the
exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying
Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its security or an
202. See Rüdiger Wolfrum & Dieter Fleck, Enforcement of International Humanitarian
Law, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 675, 682-83 (Dieter Fleck ed.,
2d ed. 2008) (“Despite a lack of practice it has to be assumed in the meantime that a broad
opinio juris exists that individuals who commit war crimes ... can be held responsible for those
acts under national or international criminal law.”). But see DEP’T OF THE ARMY, supra note
190, at 180-81 (“As the international law of war is part of the law of the land in the United
States, enemy personnel charged with war crimes are tried directly under international law
without recourse to the statutes of the United States.”). The premise of a 1956 military field
manual (FM 27-10) on this point is unclear. To say punishment occurs directly under interna-
tional law ignores the fact that a sovereign state has adopted and is independently enforcing
that law. See Baxter, supra note 186, at 338. (“In Germany, guerrilla warfare against the
Reich was defined as a crime by German law. In other countries a purported prosecution for
acting in ‘violation of the laws and customs of war’ is probably to be construed as directed
against an offence in violation of the military common law of the state concerned.” (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted)).
203. This power may be based in the Offenses Clause when no armed conflict exists. For
example, the War Crimes Act of 1996 remedied the fact that no U.S. court or military tribunal
had jurisdiction to punish war crimes against U.S. nationals after an armed conflict has end-
ed, or service members who were no longer subject to court-martial jurisdiction. See War
Crimes Act of 1995: Hearing on H.R. 2587 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 5-7 (1996) (statement of Rep. Walter B. Jones,
Jr.); id. at 13-15 (statement of John H. McNeil, Senior Deputy Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def.);
H.R. REP. NO. 104-698, at 7 (1996). During an armed conflict, military commissions have
authority to punish war crimes by or against U.S. or foreign nationals. See, e.g., In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 13-14 (denying Japanese General’s habeas corpus petition after
military commission convicted him of committing war crimes against U.S. and Filipino
nationals). 
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obstacle to the application of the present Convention.”204 An
Occupying Power may also adopt necessary security measures,205
publish and announce them in the language(s) of the population,206
and if violated, “hand over the accused to its properly constituted,
non-political military courts.”207 Punishing such offenders and of-
fenses is permitted by the law of war, and therefore within the scope
of jurisdiction granted by Articles 18.208 Punishing foreign crimes as
altered or supplemented by an occupying force is clearly an exercise
of a state’s sovereign authority that effectively creates municipal
crimes.209 
B. The Relevant “Law of War”
It is next necessary to clarify the term “law of war” in UCMJ
Article 18. A standard canon of statutory interpretation requires
interpreting statutes that incorporate a legal concept or term in
accordance with the particular definition or meaning the concept or
term had at the time it was adopted.210 With respect to the term
“law of war” in Article 18, this could mean that a court should
determine the content of the relevant “law of war” by reference to its
content when Article 18 was adopted in 1950, or perhaps even in its 
antecedent statute in 1916. Such an approach would generate
204. GC IV, supra note 50, art. 64. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. art. 65.
207. Id. art. 66.
208. Confirming this view, Rule for Courts-Martial 307(c)(2) expressly recognizes that
courts-martial may exercise jurisdiction over these offenses. It provides, “A charge states the
article of the code, law of war, or local penal law of an occupied territory which the accused
is alleged to have violated.” 2012 MCM, supra note 183, R.C.M. 307(c)(2); see also Madsen v.
Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 361-62 (1952) (upholding conviction by military commission in
occupied Germany applying German penal law to acts of civilian U.S. citizen).
209. There is no other way to characterize the punishment of military security measures.
With regard to foreign criminal law, the earlier cited 1951 MCM commentary, supra note 153,
strongly suggests the view that foreign criminal law is incorporated into the municipal law
of the occupying force, which may suspend such parts of it as it deems necessary to its securi-
ty.
210. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (“[W]here a
common-law principle is well established, ... the courts may take it as a given that Congress
has legislated with an expectation that the principle will apply except ‘when a statutory
purpose to the contrary is evident.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson,
343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)).
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significant problems for U.S. compliance with its current law of war
obligations and is likely mistaken.
It seems the better approach to interpreting “law of war” in
Article 18 is to treat it as a term of art. Regarding terms of art
incorporated by a statute, the Supreme Court has held:
[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumu-
lated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it
presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were
attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from
which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the
judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.211
The Supreme Court has long viewed “law of war” as a term of art—a
special body of knowledge with a traditional meaning in interna-
tional law.212 The term “law of war” in Article 18 must therefore be
understood to refer to current international treaties and custom
norms applicable to the armed conflict in which Article 18 authority
is being invoked. 
Confirming this understanding in Hamdan the Supreme Court
implicitly took a term-of-art approach to interpreting the term “law
of war” in UCMJ Article 21. The Court concluded that “law of war”
in Article 21 incorporated what it determined to be an applicable
provision of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.213 The United States
ratified those conventions in 1955,214 five years after adoption of the
211. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952). 
212. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1942) (“From the very beginning of its history, this
Court has recognized and applied the law of war as including that part of the law of nations
which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy nations as well
as of enemy individuals.”). In support of this assertion, the Court cites Juragua Iron Co. v.
United States, 212 U.S. 297 (1909); United States v. Pacific Railroad, 120 U.S. 227, 233 (1887);
Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 517 (1878); Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268
(1870); The William Bagaley, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 377 (1866); The Venice, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 258,
274 (1864); Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 666-67, 687 (1862); United States v. Reading,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 1, 10 (1855); The Anne, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 435, 447-48 (1818); Thirty
Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 197-98 (1815); The St. Lawrence, 13 U.S.
(9 Cranch) 120, 122 (1815); The Rapid, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 155, 159-64 (1814); Fitzsimmons
v. Newport Insurance Co., 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 185, 199 (1808); Maley v. Shattuck, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 458, 488 (1806); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 40-41 (1801); and Talbot v.
Janson, 3. U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 153, 159-61 (1795).
213. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 627-28 (2006).
214. GC I, supra note 5; GC II, supra note 50; GC III, supra note 50; GC IV, supra note 50.
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UCMJ.215 Without analysis or comment, the Court intuitively fol-
lowed a “term-of-art” approach to determining the content of the
“law of war.”216 Thus, to identify the jurisdiction and punishable
offenses created by Article 18, courts should look to the contempo-
rary law of war.
C. Punishable Conduct Under the Contemporary Law of War
The next necessary step is to determine the scope of the jurisdic-
tion and offenses created by UCMJ Article 18; in other words, to
identify the offenders and offenses punishable by military tribunal,
and the punishments permitted, under the contemporary law of
war. 
Before doing so, however, it is important to review certain com-
plexities about the body of international law known as the law of
war. While many law of war norms are universal and apply to all
armed conflicts, most treaty and some customary norms differ de-
pending upon the nature of the conflict, meaning whether an armed
conflict is classified as international or non-international.217 Further
complicating matters, not all states are party to the “main” law of
war treaties.218 A specific treaty provision applicable between some
states may not apply between others.
It is therefore important to remember that many norms in law of
war treaties, particularly those related to punishable persons and
conduct, reflect or have become norms of universal customary
215. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Pub. L. No. 81-506, arts. 2(10)-(12), 18, 21, 64 Stat.
107, 109, 114-15 (1950) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 802(a)(10)-(12), 821 (2012); 10
U.S.C. § 818 (Supp. IV 2017)).
216. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 627-28.
217. As of 2005, of the 161 rules identified by the International Committee of the Red
Cross, only nine were determined to be specific to international armed conflict, two were spe-
cific to non-international armed conflict, seven were believed clearly applicable in inter-
national armed conflict and “arguably” applicable in non-international armed conflict, and
three had slightly different rules for international versus non-international armed conflict.
The remaining 140 rules were determined to be applicable in both international and non-
international armed conflict. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International
Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in
Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 175, 187-90 (2005). For a helpful summary of the
limited number of treaties applicable to non-international armed conflict, see id. at 178.
218. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 50, at 6, 11.
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international law.219 These universal customary norms exist inde-
pendently from and concurrently with applicable treaties.220 Nations
not bound by a particular law of war treaty are still obligated to
observe any applicable universal customary international norms
that a treaty contains.221 
The fundamental requirement to observe customary law in the
absence of an applicable treaty was first reflected in a treaty pro-
vision known as the Martens Clause, adopted in the 1899 Hague
Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land. It states,
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High
Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not
included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and
belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the
principles of international law, as they result from the usages
established between civilized nations, from the laws of human-
ity, and the requirements of the public conscience.222
Adopted in different forms in major law of war treaties since,223
some of which have been universally adopted by states, this clause
“serves as a reminder that customary international law continues
to apply after the adoption of a treaty norm.”224 
For purposes of U.S. military law, the import of this fundamental
principle is that applicable customary law of war norms relating to
individual punishment are incorporated and enforced under Article
18 even if a relevant law of war treaty does not apply or is believed
219. See Henckaerts, supra note 217, at 182-83.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, pmbl.,
July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1805; see also Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, pmbl., Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 2279-80 [hereinafter Hague IV].
223. See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 1(2),
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 7 [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-Interna-
tional Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), pmbl., June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 611 [hereinafter
Protocol II]; GC I, supra note 5, art. 63; GC II, supra note 50, art. 62; GC III, supra note 50,
art. 142; GC IV, supra note 50, art. 158.
224. Rupert Ticehurst, The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict, 79 INT’L REV.
RED CROSS 125, 126 (1997).
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not to be inherently enforceable in U.S. law.225 In other words,
Article 18 effectively executes all customary law of war norms re-
lated to the punishment of individuals in U.S. military law.
It is not feasible to identify here every act that may be punished
by a military tribunal in international or non-international armed
conflict. This Section will therefore identify two principal categories
of offenses and offenders punishable by military tribunal under the
law of war, reserving a third category for the next Part. This is a
complex topic with origins in customary international law.
1. Customary Law and Individual Punishment
To identify the offenders and offenses subject to punishment by
military tribunal under the law of war, a brief review of customary
international law related to individual punishment is helpful. The
law of war traditionally had two means of enforcement: retaliation,
also known as reprisal, and individual punishment.226 Retaliation
refers to engaging in a breach of the law of war in response to an
225. This point is important for two reasons. The first is that much of the law related to in-
dividual punishment is still customary. Law of war treaties do not extinguish that customary
law but may modify it to the extent they apply. The second is that some U.S. Supreme Court
Justices have expressed the mistaken belief that law of war treaties containing enforcement
mechanisms provide the exclusive means for resolving treaty violations, and that this fact
renders those treaty norms unenforceable by federal courts. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557, 717 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The judicial nonenforceability of the Geneva
Conventions derives from the fact that those Conventions have exclusive enforcement
mechanisms.” (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 & n.14 (1950))). This aspect
of Justice Thomas’s opinion misunderstands the relevant international law and also
misapplies precedent. In Johnson v. Eisentrager, which Justice Thomas cites, the Supreme
Court held that German petitioners had no right to a writ of habeas corpus in U.S. federal
courts. 339 U.S. 763, 781 (1950). In context, the section of the opinion cited by Justice Thomas
concludes that alleged noncompliance with the 1929 Geneva Conventions did not give the
federal courts an independent basis for jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 789
& n.14. The Eisentrager Court did not state a general proposition that rights or protections
in a treaty with an international enforcement mechanism may never be made enforceable,
including by incorporation in a federal statute. For example, Article 3 of Hague Convention
(IV) of 1907 provides for enforcement, but only by reparations. Hague IV, supra note 222, art.
3. This surely does not prevent the enforcement of its annexed regulations pursuant to the
War Crimes Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(2) (2012).
226. Reparations are also generally available. See, e.g., Protocol I, supra note 223, art. 91;
Hague IV, supra note 222, art. 3; see also Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility
for States of Internationally Wrongful Acts, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N.
Doc. A/56/10, at arts. 34-37 (2001). Regarding retaliation, see generally FRITS KALSHOVEN,
BELLIGERENT REPRISALS (1971).
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enemy’s violation.227 To cite two common examples: if an army killed
prisoners of war then its enemy might kill an equal number of pris-
oners in retaliation,228 or, if civilians engaged in acts hostile to an
approaching or occupying army, that army might kill a proportion-
ate number of civilians in response.229 Because retaliation was
usually imposed against individuals innocent of wrongdoing,230 and
because it tended toward belligerents disregarding legal constraints
on warfare,231 a preference for punishing the individuals responsible
for law of war violations developed.
The idea that an offending individual may or should be punished
for violating the law of war has origins in influential legal treatises,
including Hugo Grotius’s 1625 seminal work,232 and Emmerich de
Vattel’s 1759 treatise.233 Winthrop, citing an Oxford Manual adopted
in 1880, described the then-evolving view of the relationship be-
tween retaliation and individual punishment.234 In the event of a
law of war violation, the individual offender should be punished if
possible.235 However,
[w]here the offender cannot be reached, or where, being a
member of the army or subject of the government of the enemy,
the latter refuses or neglects to bring him to trial, the only
remedy of the belligerent against which, or against a citizen or
227. MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 407-08 (1959). It has origins
in natural law according to the writings of eminent jurists. See, e.g., EMMERICH DE VATTEL,
THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND
AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS § 142 (Joseph Chitty trans., 6th Am. ed. 1844).
228. See, e.g., VATTEL, supra note 227, § 142; WINTHROP, supra note 74, at 796-97.
229. See, e.g., KALSHOVEN, supra note 226, at 200-02.
230. INST. OF INT’L LAW, THE LAWS OF WAR ON LAND art. 84 (1880), https://ihl-data-
bases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/140?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/TC5G-6KN9] (“Reprisals are
an exception to the general rule of equity, that an innocent person ought not to suffer for the
guilty. They are also at variance with the rule that each belligerent should conform to the
rules of war, without reciprocity on the part of the enemy.”).
231. See GREENSPAN, supra note 227, at 408.
232. HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE pt. III, ch. 4, para. XIII (A.C. Camp-
bell trans., Batoche Books 2001) (1625) (“[T]he law of retaliation, strictly and properly so
called, must be directly enforced upon the person of the delinquent himself. Whereas, in war,
what is called retaliation frequently redounds to the ruin of those, who are no way implicated
in the blame.”).
233. VATTEL, supra note 227, § 141 (stating that an enemy may be denied quarter, meaning
executed, for “enormous breach of ... the laws of war”).
234. See WINTHROP, supra note 74, at 796 (citing INST. OF INT’L LAW, supra note 230).
235. See id.
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citizens of which, the infraction of law has been injuriously
committed, is by retaliation or reprisal.236
In other words, by the late nineteenth century, retaliation or repri-
sal had become a measure of last resort. Since then, retaliation has
been largely prohibited by both law of war treaties,237 and customary
international law.238
As the use of reprisals declined, the law related to individual
responsibility and punishment developed. Although disagreement
existed at various points in time, particularly after the Second
World War,239 it has long been the case in U.S. military law, and is
now generally accepted in law of war treaties and customary law,
that individuals may (and in some cases must) be punished for
serious law of war violations or other acts of illegitimate warfare in
both international and non-international armed conflict.240 Indeed,
given the substantial prohibitions on retaliation, individual pun-
ishment is the primary means of enforcing the law of war.
It is also clear that the law of war generally permits the adjudica-
tion and imposition of individual punishment by military tribunal.
Text in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, related commentary by the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the ICRC’s
customary law of war study all clarify that states may use impartial
military tribunals to punish individuals.241 The key to understanding
236. Id.
237. See, e.g., Protocol I, supra note 223, art. 20 (prohibiting reprisals against medical and
religious personnel); id. art. 51(6) (“Attacks against the civilian population or civilians by way
of reprisals are prohibited.”); id. art. 53(c) (prohibiting reprisals against cultural objects); id.
art. 55(2) (“Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited.”); GC
I, supra note 5, art. 46 (“Reprisals against the wounded, sick, personnel, buildings or equip-
ment protected by the Convention are prohibited.”); GC II, supra note 50, art. 47 (“Reprisals
against the wounded, sick and shipwrecked persons, the personnel, the vessels or the equip-
ment protected by the Convention are prohibited.”); GC III, supra note 50, art. 13 (“Measures
of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited.”); GC IV, supra note 50, art. 33 (“No
protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed.
Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.”).
238. See 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 513-29 (2009) (discussing the
limited permissible and numerous prohibited reprisals under customary international law of
war).
239. See TAYLOR, supra note 155, at 218-19.
240. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 238, at 551-55.
241. See, e.g., GC IV, supra note 50, art. 66 (allowing punishment by “non-political military
courts”); Lindsey Cameron et al., Article 3: Conflicts Not of an International Character, in
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the scope of Article 18, then, is to identify the offenders and acts for
which the law of war permits punishment.
2. War Crimes
The offenses most clearly punishable by military tribunal under
the law of war, and therefore within the scope of Article 18, are war
crimes. The ICRC customary law of war study defines a “war
crime[ ]” as a “[s]erious violation[ ] of international humanitarian
law.”242 Its analysis of state practice concludes “that violations are
in practice treated as serious, and therefore as war crimes, if they
endanger protected persons or objects or if they breach important
values.”243 The grave breach provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions and their Additional Protocols also identify conduct considered
a war crime244 and require states to impose criminal punishment.245
Individuals may be punished for a war crime not only when their
acts directly violate the law of war but also for “attempting[,] ... as-
sisting in, facilitating, aiding or abetting the commission of a war
crime ... [, or] for planning or instigating the commission of a war
crime.”246 Some omissions may also be punished. For example, as
found by the U.S. Supreme Court in Yamashita,247 and now a well-
accepted rule of customary international law, it is a war crime if
military commanders knowingly fail to prevent and suppress viola-
tions of the law of war.248
INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY OF 2016, CONVENTION (I) FOR THE AMELI-
ORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD para.
680 (2d ed. 2016), https://ihl-catabases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCI-commentary [https://perma.cc/
4GZZ-L7HL] (“The requirement of independence does not necessarily preclude the court from
being composed of persons from ... members of the armed forces, so long as procedures are in
place to ensure they perform their judicial functions independently and impartially.”); INT’L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 50, at 356 (noting no court has “concluded that military
tribunals inherently violate” requirements for a regularly constituted and impartial court).
242. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 50, at 568 (Rule 156).
243. See id. at 569.
244. Protocol I, supra note 223, arts. 11, 85; GC I, supra note 5, art. 50; GC II, supra note
50, art. 51; GC III, supra note 50, art. 130; GC IV, supra note 50, art. 147.
245. Protocol I, supra note 223, art. 86; GC I, supra note 5, art. 49; GC II, supra note 50,
art. 50; GC III, supra note 50, art. 129; GC IV, supra note 50, art. 146.
246. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 238, at 554; see also ICC Statute,
supra note 3, art. 25(3) (listing six modes of participation in crimes).
247. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1946).
248. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 238, at 558-63; see also ICC Statute,
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There is a particularly difficult issue with regard to what consti-
tutes sufficient evidence that a given law of war violation is consid-
ered “serious” and therefore a war crime in customary international
law. Treaties identify grave breaches, but no single source of
international law clearly provides a universally accepted and
exhaustive list of the law of war violations deemed war crimes by
the customary law of war.249 To identify war crimes in the custom-
ary law of war, the ICRC study examines treaties, municipal legis-
lation, state military manuals, the jurisprudence of international
tribunals empowered to adjudicate war crimes, as well as historical
antecedents.250 This is a rather tedious approach to say the least.
It seems relatively clear, however, that one important source of
evidence of the acts deemed war crimes by customary international
law is the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC
Statute). The ICC Statute defines numerous war crimes for both
international and non-international armed conflict.251 Although a
treaty, at least one commentator has opined that the war crimes
listed in the ICC Statute codify years of development in the
customary law of war crimes, particularly in the area of non-
international armed conflict.252 This suggests that the Rome Statute
may contain a complete or near complete list of the war crimes
existing in customary international law at the time of its adoption.
Another author, however, has suggested that the Rome Statute may
have attempted to develop at least some war crimes law and may
therefore not reflect customary international law.253 Nevertheless,
both the ICRC study and ICC Statute are helpful resources for
identifying the law of war violations deemed war crimes by custom-
ary international law.
Because states may impose individual punishment by military
tribunal for any serious violation of the law of war, war crimes are
within the scope of acts made punishable by the law of war com-
ponent of UCMJ Article 18. This clearly includes war crimes
supra note 3, art. 28(a) (noting that knowledge may be actual or implied).
249. See, e.g., HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 238, at 568-74.
250. See id. at 574-603.
251. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 8.
252. Edoardo Greppi, The Evolution of International Criminal Responsibility Under
International Law, 81 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 531, 544 (1999).
253. Marko Milanoviæ, Is the Rome Statute Binding on Individuals? (And Why We Should
Care), 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 25, 33-34 (2011).
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committed by members of the U.S. military as well as enemy and
friendly forces.
3. Other Punishable Conduct by an Enemy
There is another, less-understood category of individuals and acts
punishable by military tribunal under the law of war. This category
includes those who engage in acts for which the law of war removes
or does not provide protection from punishment without affirma-
tively prohibiting the relevant conduct. Included in this category are
so-called unprivileged belligerents, such as spies, saboteurs, and
others who participate in the hostilities of an armed conflict without
meeting the requirements for prisoner of war status.254 The last
category has had many names, including: “guerillas, partisans, ...
war-traitors, [and] francs-tireurs.”255 In an influential article, Profes-
sor Richard Baxter described their common characteristic as
involving persons who “have committed hostile acts without meeting
the qualifications prescribed for lawful belligerents.”256
There is confusion regarding the legal basis and proper forum for
punishing these individuals. Some commentary might be read to
suggest that those who participate in the violence of a conflict with-
out protection from the law of war are common criminals punishable
only by municipal courts of the state in which their acts occurred.257
According to Professor Baxter, however, “armed and unarmed
hostilities, wherever occurring, committed by persons other than
those entitled to be treated as prisoners of war or peaceful civilians
merely deprive such individuals of a protection they might other-
wise enjoy ... and place them ... at the power of the[ir] enemy.”258
Baxter further explained that the tendency to label these acts “war
crimes” stemmed from confusion between punishable law of war
violations “and acts with respect to which [the law of war] affords no
254. See Baxter, supra note 186, at 326-27.
255. See id. at 327.
256. Id.
257. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 46 (3d ed. 2016) (arguing that engaging in such acts “merely strips
the mantle of immunity off the defendant who is therefore exposed to penal charges for any
offence committed in breach of the enemy’s domestic legal system”). But see infra note 287 and
accompanying text.
258. Baxter, supra note 186, at 343.
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protection.”259 Baxter clarified, though, the punishment of such acts
occurs under the municipal law of the capturing force,260 and might
include “the military common law of the state concerned.”261
Contemporary commentary and ICRC guidance confirm this view.262
One example of this category of punishable acts is spying.
Grotius, citing biblical sources, stated that although all spies may
be harshly punished when captured, it is not a violation of the law
of nations to send spies.263 According to Article 20 of the 1874
Brussels Declaration, “A spy taken in the act shall be tried and
treated according to the laws in force in the army which captures
him.”264 Spies may be members of a military not wearing their
country’s uniform or civilians.265 The ICRC customary law of war
study notes that punishment of those captured while spying is
permissible (after a fair trial) under the 1899 and 1907 Hague
Regulations, Geneva Convention IV of 1949, and Additional Protocol
I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, adopted in 1977.266 The authority
to punish spies is therefore firmly established in both the treaty and
customary law of war.
The punishment of spies also has deep roots in U.S. law and prac-
tice. Both British and American commanders executed suspected
259. Id. at 340.
260. Id. at 338; see also id. at 344 (“[The capturing] may require the application of domestic
law to determine something denominated in that municipal law as ‘guilt’—but a guilt only in
the sense of municipal law.”).
261. Id. at 338.
262. See, e.g., Knut Dörmann, The Legal Situation of “Unlawful/Unprivileged Combat-
ants,” 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 45, 70-71 (2003); Direct Participation in Hostilities: Questions
& Answers, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS (2009), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/
faq/direct-participation-ihl-faq-020609.htm [https://perma.cc/X684-V2RJ] (“[C]ivilians having
directly participated in hostilities can be prosecuted for any offence that they may have
committed under domestic law even if, in doing so, they did not violate IHL.”). For ICRC
guidance, see infra note 279 and accompanying text.
263. GROTIUS, supra note 232, pt. III, ch. 4, para. XV (“[S]pies, if discovered and taken, are
usually treated with the utmost severity. Yet there is no doubt, but the law of nations allows
any one to send spies, as Moses did to the land of promise, of whom Joshua was one.”).
264. Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War, art.
20, Aug. 27, 1874, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/135 [https://perma.cc/2W3X-9Q2E]
[hereinafter Brussels Declaration].
265. See Baxter, supra note 186, at 329-33; see also Brussels Declaration, supra note 264,
arts. 19-23 (defining spying and circumstances under which punishment may be imposed).
266. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 238, at 390-91. The study also cites
the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations and Additional Protocol I for evidence of the definition
of spying. See id. at 390.
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spies during the Revolutionary War.267 Congress vested courts-mar-
tial with jurisdiction to punish spies in 1806,268 which it amended in
1862 for the Civil War.269 Orders 100 declared that a “spy is
punishable with death by hanging by the neck.”270 Winthrop gives
extensive attention to U.S. practice surrounding the definition,
conviction, and punishment of spies in his treatise.271 In current
U.S. military law, Article 106 of the UCMJ defines spying for pur-
poses of courts-martial or military commissions other than those
convened pursuant to the Military Commissions Act.272 Spies are
therefore clearly punishable under U.S. military criminal law.
The contemporary law of war also permits the punishment of
others who participate in the hostilities of a conflict without being
entitled to prisoner of war status. The ICRC customary law of war
study identifies three categories of individuals and acts that do not
qualify for a protected status in international armed conflict. These
include: combatants who fail to distinguish themselves from civil-
ians during or preparatory to an attack,273 combatants who engage
in espionage if captured while doing so,274 and mercenaries.275 The
study further notes that none of these individuals can be punished
without a fair trial.276
The law of war authority to punish civilians who engage in acts
of belligerency or otherwise participate in the hostilities of an armed
conflict is even less clear. Baxter noted that the 1949 Conventions
267. See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER 9-13 (2005)
(recounting Revolutionary War executions of Major John André by Continental Army, and
Captain Nathan Hale by British Army, both for spying).
268. An Act for Establishing Rules and Articles for the Government of the Armies of the
United States, ch. 20, § 2, 2 Stat. 359, 371 (Apr. 10, 1806).
269. An Act Making an Appropriation for Completing the Defences of Washington, and for
Other Purposes, ch. 25, sec. 4, § 2, 12 Stat. 339, 339-40 (Feb. 13, 1862).
270. ORDERS 100, supra note 94, art. 88. More fully, Article 88 stated,
A spy is a person who secretly, in disguise or under false pretense, seeks infor-
mation with the intention of communicating it to the enemy.
The spy is punishable with death by hanging by the neck, whether or not he
succeed in obtaining the information or in conveying it to the enemy.
Id.
271. WINTHROP, supra note 74, at 765-71.
272. 10 U.S.C. § 906 (2012), amended by 10 U.S.C. § 903 (Supp. IV 2017).
273. HENCKERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 238, at 384 (Rule 106).
274. Id. at 389 (Rule 107).
275. Id. at 391 (Rule 108).
276. Id. at 352 (Rule 100).
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do not squarely address this topic and that it remains an issue of
customary international law.277 Additional Protocol I is similarly
unhelpful, seeking to expand the category of individuals eligible for
prisoner of war status without clearly explaining whether or which
civilians may be prosecuted and punished for participating in
hostilities.278 It is clear that civilians who commit or are complicit in
a war crime may be punished.279 Some civilians qualify for prisoner
of war status.280 The category at issue here, though, involves civil-
ians participating in the hostilities of an armed conflict without
being entitled to prisoner of war status. There is a broad range of
conduct that may qualify, from directly attacking an armed force to
various types of support to such hostilities.281 The exact relationship
between civilians who lose protection from attack for such time as
they take a direct part in hostilities and those who may be punished
for such acts is unclear.282
Additional Protocol I clarifies, however, that for the purpose of
international armed conflict, those “who are in the power of a Party
to the conflict and who do not benefit from more favourable treat-
ment under the Conventions or under this Protocol shall be treated
humanely” and lists the protections to be afforded them.283 These
protections include not being sentenced and punished for “a penal
offence related to the armed conflict except pursuant to a conviction
pronounced by an impartial and regularly constituted court re-
specting the generally recognized principles of regular judicial pro-
cedure.”284 Applicable principles include punishment solely on the
basis of individual responsibility, punishing only acts that were
crimes when committed, a presumption of innocence, a right against
self-incrimination, and others.285 So long as these conditions are
277. Baxter, supra note 186, at 327-28.
278. Protocol I, supra note 223, arts. 43-47. 
279. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 238, at 607-08 (Rule 158); Baxter,
supra note 186, at 338. Although not formally a part of a state’s armed forces, civilians who
are part of a levée en masse are entitled to prisoners of war status and are protected from
punishment for their participation in the hostilities of a conflict. See GC III, supra note 50,
art. 4(A)(6).
280. See GC III, supra note 50, art. 4(B)(1)-(2). 
281. See Baxter, supra note 186, at 333-42.
282. See Protocol I, supra note 223, art. 51(3).
283. Id. art. 75.
284. Id. art. 75(4) (emphasis added).
285. Id.
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met, Additional Protocol I appears to implicitly recognize that some
individuals who have participated in the hostilities of an armed
conflict without being entitled to a protected status may be pun-
ished, as recent ICRC guidance acknowledges.286
In non-international armed conflict, the existence of this category
of punishable individuals is less clear. Because the concepts of
combatant status, prisoner of war, and combatant immunity do not
formally exist in the law of war applicable to non-international
armed conflict, what constitutes a loss of protected status for
purposes of punishment is less certain.287 This law of war does,
however, distinguish those involved in fighting from those no longer
fighting and civilians.288 It also provides for the general protection
of civilians from violence. For example, Common Article 3 requires
that “[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities ... be treated
humanely.”289 Attacking the civilian population and attacking
individual civilians who are not taking an active part in hostilities
are war crimes in non-international armed conflict.290 The law of
war applicable to non-international armed conflict therefore also
appears to implicitly recognize that states may punish those who
engage in violence on behalf of a party to the conflict without
domestic legal authority, such as members of a non-state armed
group.291 The limitations on imposing such punishment are that the
286. See NILS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE
NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
84 (2009) (“Consequently, civilians who have directly participated in hostilities and members
of organized armed groups belonging to a non-State party to a conflict may be prosecuted and
punished to the extent that their activities, their membership, or the harm caused by them
is penalized under national law (as treason, arson, murder, etc.).” (footnote omitted)).
Punishing acts of unprivileged belligerency under domestic law incorporating this general
category of individuals and acts, as Article 18 does, certainly seems consistent with this
guidance. See 10 U.S.C. § 818(a) (Supp. IV 2017).
287. MELZER, supra note 286, at 83 (“[The law of war] provides an express ‘right’ to directly
participate in hostilities only for members of the armed forces of parties to international
armed conflicts and participants in a levée en masse.”).
288. See, e.g., LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 38, at 1048-49.
289. See, e.g., GC III, supra note 50, art. 3(I).
290. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 8(2)(e)(I), (f).
291. See MELZER, supra note 286, at 84 (“[M]embers of organized armed groups belonging
to a non-State party to a conflict may be ... punished.” (footnote omitted)).
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crimes prosecuted exist in domestic law,292 and that individuals are
afforded fair trial and other rights required by the law of war.293 
In U.S. military law, the power to punish individuals engaging in
hostilities without either state authority or other entitlement to a
protected status has long existed in both non-international and
international armed conflict, as Orders 100294 and U.S. practice
during the Mexican and Civil Wars indicate.295 Article 18 should
therefore be read to effectively create not only jurisdiction to punish
such individuals but also domestic offenses punishing all qualifying
acts.296
 The question then becomes whether Article 18 prohibits mem-
bers of the U.S. military from being spies or saboteurs, or from being
complicit in employing irregular forces or others unqualified for
prisoner of war or civilian status in the hostilities of a conflict. The
answer is clearly no. As Professor Baxter explained, the law of war
permits punishment of those who engage in such forms of belliger-
ency, but does not directly prohibit a belligerent from using such
forces or methods.297 He clarified that “the law of nations has not
ventured to require of states that they prevent the belligerent
activities of their citizenry or that they refrain from the use of secret
agents or that these activities upon the part of their military forces
or civilian population be punished.”298 Recent guidance from the
292. See Protocol I, supra note 223, art. 75(4)(c). See generally HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-
BECK, supra note 238.
293. See, e.g., Protocol II, supra note 223, art. 6.
294. ORDERS 100, supra note 94, arts. 82-85 (defining, in order, punishable irregular fight-
ers, spies, “[a]rmed prowlers” (also known as saboteurs), and “[w]ar-rebels”).
295. WINTHROP, supra note 74, at 783-84; Dehn, supra note 17, at 76-78.
296. See 10 U.S.C. § 818(a) (Supp. IV 2017). The nature of the acts fitting within the offense
would be determined first by the commander referring the charges to courts-martial and then
by the finder of fact. An important caveat here is that the United States is not party to Addi-
tional Protocol I, see INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 50, at 6, which broadens the
range of individuals entitled to prisoner of war status and combatant immunity, Protocol I,
supra note 223, arts. 43-44. The U.S. does not accept that expansion of the category and
resists the notion that these treaty provisions reflect or have become universal customary
international law to which it is bound. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 238,
at 389 (“[T]he United States has changed its position and voiced its opposition to this rule.”).
This means that the United States would consider a broader category of individuals to be
subject to punishment. 
297. Baxter, supra note 186, at 342.
298. Id. 
2018] THE LAW OF WAR 869
ICRC confirms this view.299 In other words, for purposes of Article
18, only individuals who engage in these activities on behalf of an
enemy force in armed conflict with the United States are “tria[ble]
by a military tribunal,” whose punishment is “permitted by the law
of war.”300 While this result may seem anomalous, the anomaly
exists in the law of war rather than in U.S. law.
In sum, Article 18 not only vests courts-martial with jurisdiction
over certain persons and acts, but also creates municipal offenses
punishing international war crimes and other acts by adversaries for
which the law of war removes protection and permits punishment.
It therefore authorizes punishment of members of the U.S. military
and others—including civilians accompanying the military in an
armed conflict—who commit war crimes.301 This does not fully
explain whether other law of war violations may be punished, or the
general relationship of law of war violations to the punitive articles
of the UCMJ. I next turn to these topics.
IV. LAW OF WAR VIOLATIONS AND THE PUNITIVE ARTICLES OF THE
UCMJ
While it is clear that service members may be tried by courts-
martial for war crimes, it is not clear whether they may be punished
for other law of war violations. As earlier mentioned, the Rules for
Courts-Martial, promulgated by rulemaking authority delegated to
the President,302 state that court-martial charges may include law
of war violations without qualification.303 The Law of War Manual
also indicates that law of war violations may be prosecuted, as such,
299. MELZER, supra note 286, at 83-84 (“[C]ivilian direct participation in hostilities is
neither prohibited by [the law of war] nor criminalized under the statutes of any prior or
current international criminal tribunal or court.” (footnote omitted)).
300. See 10 U.S.C. § 818.
301. 10 U.S.C. § 802 (2012).
302. Id. § 836(a) (“Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of proof, for
cases arising under this chapter triable in courts-martial, military commissions and other
military tribunals, and procedures for courts of inquiry, may be prescribed by the President
by regulations which shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of law and
the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States
district courts, but which may not ... be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter.”).
303. R.C.M. 307(c)(2) states, “A charge states the article of the code, law of war, or local
penal law of an occupied territory which the accused is alleged to have violated.” 2012 MCM,
supra note 183, R.C.M. 307(c)(2).
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by courts-martial.304 Neither of these sources, however, limit charge-
able law of war violations to those defined as war crimes by inter-
national law. This raises the obvious question of whether other law
of war violations are subject to criminal prosecution under Article
18, and if so, why and against whom.
Complicating matters further, a comment in the Rules for Courts-
Martial provides that, for those subject to the UCMJ, a UCMJ
offense rather than a law of war violation should “[o]rdinarily” be
charged.305 The Law of War Manual parrots this guidance.306 Both
are consistent with prior Manuals for Courts-Martial.307 None of
these manuals explain the relationship between violations of the
law of war and the punitive articles of the UCMJ.308 This raises
the obvious question of precisely why a law of war violation may be
punished as a UCMJ offense. 
This Part explains that the view both preceding and underlying
Article 18 is that law of war compliance is required to claim public
authority to engage in otherwise criminal conduct. This explains
why all law of war violations resulting in a common crime may be
punished, and why reasonable compliance with the law of war is
necessary to a U.S. service member’s justification for engaging in
acts during war that are otherwise UCMJ offenses.
304. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 38, at 1120-21.
305. 2012 MCM, supra note 183, R.C.M. 307(c)(2) cmt. (D) (“Ordinarily persons subject to
the code should be charged with a specific violation of the code rather than a violation of the
law of war.”).
306. See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 38, at 1119-20 (“The principal way for the
United States to punish members of the U.S. armed forces for violations of the law of war is
through the Uniform Code of Military Justice.... Offenses under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice that may be used to punish conduct that constitutes a violation of the law of war
include, among others: cruelty and maltreatment; murder; rape and sexual assault; failure
to obey order or regulation; and conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline.” (footnotes
omitted)).
307. See, e.g., 2008 MCM, supra note 189, R.C.M. 307(c)(2) cmt. (D); 2000 MCM, supra note
189, R.C.M. 307(c)(2) cmt. (D).
308. See, e.g., LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 38, at 1118-20.
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A. Law of War Compliance as a Justification of Violence
Replacing the common law of earlier military tribunals and codes,
the punitive articles of the UCMJ proscribe most common crimes,
such as murder, assault, maiming, arson, and many others,309 and
makes them applicable “in all places.”310 These crimes therefore
apply to service members in foreign territory and on the high seas
during both peace and war. Without an applicable affirmative de-
fense, service members engaged in common wartime activities could
technically be prosecuted for these UCMJ crimes. It is therefore
necessary to understand the source and substance of defenses to
crimes under the UCMJ in order to determine how they relate to the
law of war.
1. The Source of UCMJ Defenses
It is not initially clear how law of war compliance would inform
an affirmative criminal defense under the UCMJ. This is in part
because the source of affirmative defenses to crimes under the
UCMJ is not often discussed or litigated. Other than the defense
of lack of mental responsibility, the UCMJ has never affirmatively
prescribed general defenses to crimes.311 
Although Rule for Courts-Martial 916 lists several potential de-
fenses,312 Congress has not delegated any authority to prescribe sub-
stantive criminal law to the President.313 Rule 916 cannot be the
source of law for the affirmative defenses that it lists. The Rule can
only be declaratory of existing law.314 The source of affirmative de-
fenses to crimes in U.S. military law is nowhere expressly identified.
In fact, the Manuals for Courts-Martial did not even include a list
309. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 877-934 (2012) (UCMJ punitive articles), amended by 10 U.S.C.
§§ 877-934 (Supp. IV 2017).
310. See 10 U.S.C. § 805 (2012).
311. See 10 U.S.C. § 850a (2012 & Supp. IV 2017).
312. 2012 MCM, supra note 183, R.C.M. 916(c)-(k).
313. See 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (2012). The President’s authority is limited to prescribing
“[p]retrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of proof, for cases arising under
this chapter triable in courts-martial, military commissions and other military tribunals.” Id.
(emphasis added).
314. See id.
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of potential generally applicable affirmative defenses until 1968,
and then did so without discussing or explaining their origins.315
Relevant to a service member’s actions in war, the general
defenses to crimes in Rule for Courts-Martial 916(c) lists a justifica-
tion defense: “A death, injury, or other act caused or done in the
proper performance of a legal duty is justified and not unlawful.”316
The comments to Rule 916(c) state that law enforcement apprehen-
sion is one example of this defense, and that “killing an enemy
combatant in battle is justified.”317 The comments do not clarify
whether only reasonable force may be used to apprehend a suspect
or whether an enemy may be killed only in a manner consistent
with the law of war.318 The exact source of this defense, its precise
content, and its relationship to the law of war, if any, is nowhere
identified or explained.
To identify the source of defenses under the UCMJ and their
relationship to the law of war, it is helpful to briefly retrace their
articulation and use. Common law defenses to specific crimes were
mentioned in the first Manual for Courts-Martial published after
adoption of the UCMJ. In relation to the crime of murder, for
example, the 1951 Manual included the following commentary:
A homicide committed in the proper performance of a legal
duty is justifiable. Thus executing a person pursuant to a legal
sentence of death, killing in suppression of a mutiny or riot,
killing to prevent the escape of a prisoner if no other reasonably
apparent means are adequate, killing an enemy in battle, and
killing to prevent the commission of an offense attempted by
force or surprise such as burglary, robbery, or aggravated ar-
son, are cases of justifiable homicide.
The general rule is that the acts of a subordinate, done in
good faith in compliance with his supposed duty or orders, are
justifiable. This justification does not exist, however, when
those acts are manifestly beyond the scope of his authority, or
the order is such that a man of ordinary sense and understand-
ing would know it to be illegal.319
315. 1968 MCM, supra note 182, ch. 29, ¶ 216.
316. 2012 MCM, supra note 183, R.C.M. 916(c).
317. Id. R.C.M. 916(c) cmt.
318. See id.
319. 1951 MCM, supra note 153, ch. 38, ¶ 197b.
2018] THE LAW OF WAR 873
No authority is cited for this commentary, which clearly adopts
what is generally referred to as a “public authority” defense.320
There is scant evidence of the precise source of this or other
defenses in U.S. military law.
The case law and commentary related to the defense of self-
defense is instructive. The commentary in the 1951 Manual also
included self-defense as a defense to murder.321 When examining an
early claim of self-defense under the UCMJ, the Court of Military
Appeals noted that the substance of the defense was not within the
President’s congressionally delegated rulemaking authority.322 It
then held that a trial judge’s instruction, which was based upon the
1951 Manual’s self-defense commentary, was incorrect.323 The court
stated that the instruction must be changed to accurately reflect
the defense and recommended changing the manual’s commentary
to prevent future errors.324 This strongly suggests that the reviewing
court viewed the law of self-defense as entirely independent from
UCMJ and Manual for Courts-Martial.
Absent legislative definition, the only possible source of affirma-
tive defenses under the UCMJ is Anglo-American common law.
Recall that prior to the 1916 Articles of War, military commissions,
rather than courts-martial, exercised jurisdiction over common
law crimes.325 The only exceptions were in the aforementioned stat-
utes extending court-martial jurisdiction to certain common law
crimes during war.326 Regardless of the source of a tribunal’s
jurisdiction over a common law offense, whether by common law or
statute, Winthrop observed that military tribunals must look to the
common law for the definition of those crimes.327 He also noted that
320. See infra Part IV.B.
321. 1951 MCM, supra note 153, ch. 38, ¶ 197c.
322. See United States v. Acosta-Vargas, 32 C.M.R. 388, 392 (C.M.A. 1962) (“The portion
of [the] Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, upon which the questioned instruc-
tion is evidently grounded, relates to a question of substantive law and not to a matter of
procedure or mode of proof.” (footnote omitted) (citing United States v. Smith, 32 C.M.R. 105
(C.M.A. 1962))).
323. Id. at 392-93.
324. Id.
325. See supra Part II.
326. See supra notes 92, 119 and accompanying text. 
327. WINTHROP, supra note 74, at 671 (“It is to be observed that as these crimes are not
specifically defined in the Article, or elsewhere in the written military law, they are to be
interpreted by the doctrines of the common law, each being viewed as the common-law offence
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placing common law crimes within the jurisdiction of military tri-
bunals necessarily allowed the invocation of relevant common law
defenses.328
 The text of some UCMJ punitive articles provides additional
support for the conclusion that Anglo-American common law is the
source of affirmative defenses under the UCMJ. For example, the
1950 UCMJ defined murder, as it does today, as “[a]ny person
subject to this code who, without justification or excuse, unlawfully
kills a human being.”329 The UCMJ nowhere defines the terms
“justification” or “excuse.” Other punitive articles also use general,
undefined terms, such as “unlawful.”330 Even though the UCMJ did
not define these terms, it is common practice in the American legal
system to look to the common law,331 including that of defenses,332
to do so, unless the nature or definition of a crime clearly excludes
a common law defense.333 Thus, just as Winthrop concluded, albeit
for slightly different legal reasons, prescribing common crimes in
the UCMJ allows individuals to invoke common law defenses to
those crimes, even if those defenses were not affirmatively pre-
scribed.
2. Defenses and the Law of War
Clarifying that the common law is the source of defenses to crimes
under the UCMJ does not explain how the law of war is relevant.
of the same name.”).
328. Id. at 674 (accepting applicability of and explaining defenses of justification and self-
defense in relation to the crime of murder).
329. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Pub. L. No. 81-506, art. 118, 64 Stat. 107, 140
(1950); see also 10 U.S.C. § 918 (Supp. II 2015), amended by 10 U.S.C. § 918 (Supp. IV 2017).
330. See, e.g., art. 128(a), 64 Stat. at 141 (defining assault to include “unlawful force or
violence”).
331. See United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957) (“[W]here a federal criminal
statute uses a common-law term of established meaning without otherwise defining it, the
general practice is to give that term its common-law meaning.”); supra note 211 and
accompanying text.
332. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1228-31 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
333. For an example in military case law, see United States v. Washington, 57 M.J. 394,
397-98 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (holding duress not a defense to disobedience of a lawful order because
military orders sometimes require soldiers to risk their lives). This is a specific instance of a
general rule of statutory construction that common law terms will not retain their generally
accepted common law meaning if doing so would frustrate “Congress’ general purpose in
enacting a law.” Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 117 (1990).
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The clearest statement of the traditional U.S. view of the relation-
ship between law of war and domestic criminal law was in a 1956
military field manual (FM 27-10). It states:
The United States normally punishes war crimes as such only
if they are committed by enemy nationals or by persons serving
the interests of the enemy State. Violations of the law of war
committed by persons subject to the military law of the United
States will usually constitute violations of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice and, if so, will be prosecuted under that Code.
Violations of the law of war committed within the United States
by other persons will usually constitute violations of federal or
state criminal law and preferably will be prosecuted under such
law.334
The Law of War Manual articulates a similar view without ex-
plaining how or why an international law violation results in a
domestic crime.335
Nevertheless, the premise underlying this view seems clear:
compliance with the law of war is necessary to justify acts of vio-
lence to or interference with persons or property otherwise prohib-
ited by general criminal law. Those who violate the law of war may
therefore be punished for any criminal act that is entailed in or
results from a law of war violation. In other words, all violations of
the law of war remove one’s public authority to engage in violence.
In the law of war, the protection afforded to lawful acts of war is
known as combatant immunity or the combatant’s privilege, which
is merely a form of international law immunity from punishment,
like diplomatic immunity.336 This theoretical approach is consistent
with the practice of military tribunals described earlier in this
Article.337
Relevant military case law under the UCMJ follows this ap-
proach. For example, in his petition for a new trial related to the My
Lai Massacre in Vietnam, Lieutenant Calley claimed that his unit’s
execution of villagers was justified because they had assisted the
Viet Cong and therefore lost their status as protected civilians
334. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, supra note 190, at 182.
335. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 38, at 1118-19.
336. See Dehn, supra note 17, at 66.
337. See supra Parts II.A-C.
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without meeting the requirements for protection as prisoners of
war.338 The Army Appellate Court rejected the defense because,
regardless of the truth of Calley’s factual assertions, the law of war
forbids the mass execution of irregular fighters without trial.339
Calley’s attempted public authority justification defense therefore
failed.340 In another case, a military review board upheld a trial
judge’s refusal to allow an obedience-to-orders defense when the
alleged order would have been a manifest violation of the law of war
and not a justification for killing a prisoner of war.341 This case law
is consistent with the view offered in FM 27-10, but does not fully
explain how compliance with the law of war provides a justification
for otherwise applicable crimes defined in the UCMJ.
Traditionally, the law of war was understood to be a form of com-
mon law inherently enforceable at courts-martial as well as U.S.
common law military tribunals.342 Not only did the common law
inform justification defenses, so did the common law of war if an
alleged offense occurred in war.343 These conclusions are further
supported by the fact that, well before the UCMJ, Winthrop noted
that the law of war could be relevant to any charge being prosecuted
at court-martial. He stated:
[T]he unwritten laws and customs of war, as generally under-
stood in our armies or as defined by writers of authority, will
often properly be consulted as indicating whether certain acts
are to be regarded as constituting the offences charged, or what
measure of punishment will be just and adequate in the event
of conviction.344
338. See United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131, 1174 (A.C.M.R. 1973), aff’d, 48 C.M.R.
19 (C.M.A. 1973); see also United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 26 (C.M.A. 1973) (citing with
approval the trial judge’s instruction that “[t]he killing of resisting or fleeing enemy forces is
generally recognized as a justifiable act of war, and you may consider any such killings
justifiable in this case”).
339. See Calley, 46 C.M.R. at 1174.
340. See id.
341. See United States v. Griffen, 39 C.M.R. 586, 590 (A.B.R. 1968).
342. See WINTHROP, supra note 74, at 42.
343. See id.
344. Id.
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Winthrop clearly concludes that the customary (or common) law of
war is inherently applicable and enforceable at courts-martial.345
That view is consistent with the Supreme Court’s long-standing
treatment of the law of war in federal courts, at least in cases in-
volving war with foreign entities.346 It is also consistent with the
American practice of considering potentially applicable common law
defenses in criminal trials even when those defenses are not pre-
scribed by statute.
If a court were reluctant to conclude that the law of war is
inherently applicable to military operations and enforceable at
courts-martial, there are at least two arguments that Article 18
incorporates the law of war not only to create municipal criminal
offenses but also as a defense. The first is based on the purpose and
schema of the UCMJ. The clear intent of Article 18 is to vest courts-
martial with jurisdiction to punish all conduct punishable by
military tribunals under the law of war, as had existed under the
1916 Articles of War.347 Just as domestic crimes incorporating the
law of war by reference were created by Article 18, the law of war is
necessarily incorporated as a defense to the crimes defined in the
punitive articles, as was the case prior to the UCMJ. Although the
text vesting jurisdiction to punish violations of the UCMJ punitive
articles is distinct from the text vesting law of war jurisdiction, the
two provisions must be read together and in light of the history
leading to their adoption.348 The punitive articles replaced common
law offenses to which the law of war had always been a potential
defense at military tribunals.349 Article 18’s affirmative authority to
adjudge “punishment[s] permitted by the law of war” should there-
fore be understood to prevent the punishment of UCMJ punitive
articles in cases to which the law of war applies and has been
followed.350
A narrower potential textual anchor for a law of war justification
defense might simply be Article 18’s reference to “punishment per-
345. Winthrop also stated a court-martial could take judicial notice of the law of war. See
id. at 318-19.
346. See generally Dehn, supra note 17. 
347. See supra Part III.
348. See 10 U.S.C. § 818(a) (Supp. IV 2017).
349. See supra notes 344-46 and accompanying text.
350. See 10 U.S.C. § 818(a).
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mitted by the law of war.”351 If a law of war violation is charged as
such, an accused’s claim that he complied with the law of war is a
direct challenge to the charged offense. If the violation of a UCMJ
punitive article is charged instead of a law of war violation, a
defense that one’s conduct occurred in the context of an armed
conflict and was consistent with the law of war should similarly still
apply.352 Punishment in such circumstances is not “permitted by the
law of war.” A prosecutor’s decision to charge a UCMJ offense rather
than a law of war violation should not eliminate an otherwise
available defense.
Customary and conventional law of war norms also reveal why all
U.S. nationals subject to the UCMJ may be punished for any law of
war violation. The customary law of war requires states to suppress
all law of war violations, not merely war crimes or violations by
members of their armed forces.353 Law of war treaties impose like
obligations. For example, in addition to requiring states to punish
grave breaches, the 1949 Geneva Conventions require states to
“take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to
the provisions of the [1949 Geneva Conventions] other than the
grave breaches.”354 The additional protocols to the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions impose similar requirements.355 Thus, both the customary
and treaty law of war “permit” a state to punish its nationals by
military tribunal for any law of war violation. Whether a state does
so, or whether it may do so by military tribunal, depends solely upon
its domestic law. Article 18 of the UCMJ vests courts-martial with
jurisdiction to punish both members of the military and, when
coupled with UCMJ Article 2(10), civilians accompanying the
military in the field during an armed conflict.356
Because the punitive articles of the UCMJ apply everywhere, at-
tacking or capturing enemy persons or property may be prosecuted
351. See id.
352. See supra Part IV.A.1.
353. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 238, at 495.
354. GC I, supra note 5, art. 49; see also GC II, supra note 50, art. 50 (same); GC III, supra
note 50, art. 129 (same); GC IV, supra note 50, art. 146 (same).
355. See Protocol I, supra note 223, art. 87 ([T]he [p]arties to the conflict shall require
military commanders ... to suppress and to report to competent authorities breaches of the
Conventions and of this Protocol ... and, where appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or penal
action against violators thereof.”); Protocol II, supra note 223, pmbl.
356. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 802(a)(10), 818 (2012 & Supp. IV 2017).
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and punished unless there is legal authority justifying those
(typically criminal) acts. Pursuant to Article 18, law of war compli-
ance is necessary to any such justification.357 Just as common law
defenses are not limited to crimes, such as UCMJ murder, that
expressly (albeit generally) incorporate them in their text, any
potentially criminal act in an armed conflict is lawful if consistent
with the applicable law of war.358
Consider several examples. Killing an enemy combatant in battle
is justified, just as the Manual for Courts-Martial states, but only
if the acts leading to the death complied with the law of war.
Similarly, a soldier who uses physical force to detain an individual
on the battlefield does not commit unlawful assault if the force used
is reasonable under the circumstances and the detention is consis-
tent with the applicable law of war. Destroying an enemy barracks
or headquarters building is not arson if the attack is consistent with
the law of war. A soldier who breaks and enters the home of an
insurgent, at night, to seize a large weapons cache does not commit
burglary if his actions do not violate the applicable law of war.
Service members responsible for guarding individuals properly
detained under the law of war may use necessary and reasonable
force to prevent their escape. All of these acts are with one’s public
authority to participate in an armed conflict, and are therefore
justified. 
Conversely, any law of war violation—even one that is not an
international war crime—falls within the scope of Article 18 and
may be charged under an applicable UCMJ punitive article. An
infantryman who uses clearly excessive force during the capture of
an enemy, or a guard or interrogator who physically assaults or
otherwise abuses a prisoner of war or other detainee, may be
charged with assault,359 or cruelty and maltreatment.360 If any such
acts were to result in permanent disability or disfigurement, he or
she may be charged as maiming.361 If an unintentional death
357. See id. § 818(a).
358. For example, federal courts have interpreted the term “unlawful” to be “equivalent”
to “without excuse or justification.” See, e.g., Territory v. Gonzales, 89 P. 250, 252 (Terr. N.M.
1907).
359. See 10 U.S.C. § 928 (2012), amended by 10 U.S.C. § 928 (Supp. IV 2017).
360. See 10 U.S.C. § 893 (Supp. IV 2017).
361. See 10 U.S.C. § 924 (2012), amended by 10 U.S.C. § 928(a) (Supp. IV 2017).
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results, a prosecutor could charge involuntary manslaughter,362 or
potentially negligent homicide.363
B. Contours of the Public Authority Justification Defense
Given its evident relationship to the law of war, it is essential to
clarify the contours of the public authority justification defense.
The idea that law of war compliance is necessary to justify an
individual’s actions in armed conflict that are otherwise crimes
under the UCMJ might be troubling to the average soldier, sailor,
airman, or marine. The correct application of the law of war can be
unclear in the chaos and fog of war. Additionally, service members
often carry out missions based upon information provided by others,
such as superior commanders or military and civilian intelligence
analysts. If perfect compliance with the law of war were required to
justify all acts of violence, service members might justifiably become
paralyzed by fear of criminal prosecution. This Section provides two
reasons why such concerns are not as significant as they may at
first appear. First, not all law of war violations are inherently crim-
inal or necessarily result in the violation of a UCMJ punitive article.
Second, the public authority justification defense requires only
reasonable rather than perfect compliance with the law of war.
1. Noncriminal Law of War Violations
Not every law of war violation is inherently criminal or results in
the violation of a punitive article of the UCMJ. Following the FM
27-10 view that “[e]very violation of the law of war is a war
crime,”364 at least one commentator has used the term “administra-
tive war crime” to describe law of war violations that do not entail
harm to or criminal interference with persons or property.365 That
label is misleading. Such violations constitute violations of an inter-
national obligation and create international legal responsibility, but
362. See 10 U.S.C. § 919(b) (Supp. IV 2017).
363. See 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2012), amended by 10 U.S.C. § 934 (Supp. IV 2017); 2012 MCM,
supra note 183, pt. IV, ¶ 85.
364. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, supra note 190, at 178.
365. See GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
IN WAR 331-32 (2d ed. 2016).
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they do not necessarily create individual criminal responsibility.366
For example, the third 1949 Geneva Convention requires states to
provide prisoners of war with opportunities for physical activities
including sports,367 and a “canteen” “where prisoners of war may
procure foodstuffs, soap and tobacco and ordinary articles in daily
use.”368 The failure to do these things, standing alone, does not
result in unlawful harm to any individuals or otherwise render their
continued detention unlawful. While there are several potential ex-
amples of such violations, it is only here necessary to note that not
all law of war violations will necessarily entail or result in the
violation of a UCMJ punitive article. With that said, the violations
of an order to perform such acts could be punished as a violation of
any such order.369
2. Public Authority: Necessity and Reasonableness
The idea that a public official may lawfully use force in the proper
performance of her duties is an old one.370 The idea that public
authority is required to engage in war has even deeper roots.371 It
should be no surprise, then, that Anglo-American criminal law
commentators have long recognized that using necessary and rea-
sonable violence in the performance of one’s public duties renders
otherwise criminal conduct lawful,372 and that exceeding one’s
366. See, e.g., Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 226, art. 12.
367. See GC III, supra note 50, art. 38.
368. Id. art. 28.
369. See 10 U.S.C. § 890(2) (2012) (proscribing willful disobedience of a lawful order of a
commissioned officer), amended by 10 U.S.C. § 890 (Supp. IV 2017); 10 U.S.C. § 891(2) (Supp.
IV 2017) (proscribing willful disobedience of lawful order of warrant or noncommissioned of-
ficer); id. § 892(1) (proscribing violation of or failure to obey a lawful general order or
regulation); see also LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 38, at 1087.
370. See, e.g., GROTIUS, supra note 232, pt. I, ch. 3, no. IV (“[E]very magistrate, in case of
resistance, seems to have a right to take up arms, to maintain his authority in the execution
of his offices; as well as to defend people committed to his protection.”).
371. Grotius cites Plato, Roman law, and other ancient sources for the proposition that “no
war can be made but by the authority of the sovereign in each state.” Id. This principle was
recognized and implemented in the United States in the Neutrality Act of 1794, which
prohibits private citizens from waging wars against foreign sovereigns or persons without
public authority. Neutrality Act of 1794, ch. 50, § 5, 1 Stat. 381, 384. 
372. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 179-80 (1769)
(photo. reprt. 1966) (outlining justifiable homicides by officers enforcing the law).
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authority in the use of such violence is criminal.373 With respect to
justifiable homicides, for example, Blackstone noted that they must
be “for the advancement of public justice,”374 and that “there must be
an apparent necessity on the officer’s side [meaning] that the party
could not be arrested or apprehended.”375 Blackstone therefore
implicitly recognized that principles of necessity and reasonableness
limited the permissible scope of one’s public functions, and therefore
the public authority to use force.
Blackstone’s view is reflected in a recent American legal treatise,
which states that “[d]eeds which otherwise would be criminal, such
as taking or destroying property, taking hold of a person by force
and against his will, placing him in confinement, or even taking his
life, are not crimes if done with proper public authority.”376 However,
“[t]he public authority justification does not excuse all conduct of
public officials from all criminal prohibitions. The legislature may
design some criminal prohibitions to place bounds on the kinds of
governmental conduct that can be authorized by the Executive.”377
Logically, then, the law of war as implemented in Article 18 limits
one’s ability to claim public authority in an armed conflict. Because
Congress has authorized the punishment of any law of war violation
by courts-martial, the law of war is a limit upon a service member’s
public authority in armed conflict.
There are two essential elements of a valid claim of public auth-
ority. First, the act must be necessary to further a public interest
within an official’s sphere of authority; second, the act must be both
necessary to advancing that interest and reasonable under the
circumstances.378 Related to law enforcement, for example, the
373. See, e.g., id. at 178-79.
374. Id. at 179.
375. Id. at 180.
376. ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 1093 (3d ed. 1982).
377. Memorandum for the Attorney General Re: Applicability of Federal Criminal Laws
and the Constitution to Contemplated Lethal Operations Against Shaykh Anwar al-Aulaqi
from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Dep’t of
Justice 16 (July 16, 2010).
378. As Professor Paul Robinson’s treatise puts it:
The general form of all public authority justification principles may be stated as
follows:
Public Authority. Conduct constituting an offense is justified if
(1)(a) the actor has a public authority; and
(b) there arises the need for action protecting or furthering the particular
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Supreme Court has stated that general “[c]riminal prohibitions do
not generally apply to reasonable enforcement actions by officers of
the law.”379 Law enforcement officers may use reasonable force in
carrying out enforcement activities, such as apprehending a
suspect.380 This might include lethal force when officers reasonably
conclude that a fleeing subject poses a threat of death or great
bodily injury to the officers or others.381
A public authority justification defense has long been understood
to exist in U.S. military law. Winthrop stated, “Homicide is said to
be ‘justifiable’ when committed by a public officer in the due execu-
tion of the laws or administration of public justice.”382 As the earlier-
referenced 1951 Manual put it, “The general rule is that the acts of
a subordinate, done in good faith in compliance with his supposed
duty or orders, are justifiable.”383 Such “justification does not exist,
however, when those acts are manifestly beyond the scope of his
authority, or the order is such that a man of ordinary sense and
understanding would know it to be illegal.”384 Clearly then, the
principles of necessity and reasonableness, as well as any applicable
international or domestic law delineate the measures one may
lawfully take in the performance of their duties, even when those
duties involve fighting a war.
The public authority principle and its necessity and reasonable-
ness elements are also reflected in the long-standing law of war
principle of military necessity. As articulated in Orders 100:
“Military necessity ... consists in the necessity of those measures
interest at stake; and
(2) consistent with his authority, the actor engages in conduct, constituting the
offense,
(a) when and to the extent necessary to protect or further the interests at stake,
(b) that is reasonable in relation to the gravity of the harm threatened or the
importance of the interest to be furthered.
2 PAUL H. ROBINSON ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 141 (2017).
379. Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 406 (1998) (citing ROBINSON ET AL., supra note
378, § 142(a)) (emphasis added).
380. See ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 378, § 142.
381. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (“Where the officer has probable cause to
believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to
others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force.”).
382. WINTHROP, supra note 74, at 674.
383. See 1951 MCM, supra note 153, ch. 28, ¶ 197b.
384. Id.
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which are indispensable (or necessary) for securing the ends of the
war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages
of war.”385 Modern legal treatises adopt this definition in sub-
stance.386 This doctrine of military necessity clarifies that reason-
able and necessary wartime actions may never include actions that
violate the law of war. The Law of War Manual likewise notes that
while military necessity authorizes a wide array of violent and
nonviolent military measures, it can never justify violations of the
law of war.387 In forming the law of war, nations have already
considered the exigencies of war and balanced the competing
interests.388 Not even extreme necessity will justify violating clearly
established law of war norms.389 By vesting courts-martial with
jurisdiction to impose “punishment[s] permitted by the law of war,”
Congress has implemented these principles in U.S. military law.390
All of this means that warfighters need not be perfect; their
actions must only be within their scope of authority and reasonable
under the circumstances. Evaluating the reasonableness of actions
undertaken in war does not occur in a vacuum. It involves examin-
ing the precise actions taken and the surrounding circumstances in
light of applicable legal obligations and prohibitions. Reasonable-
ness must be judged not only based upon the actual circumstances
existing at the time, but also upon a person’s reasonable percep-
tion(s) of them in a complex and chaotic combat environment. This
would include reasonable reliance upon information provided by
others, such as strategic or battlefield intelligence.
Superior orders are also relevant to determining the scope of a
subordinate’s public authority.391 Thus, determining the reasonable-
ness of a given act may also require an evaluation of what a subord-
inate reasonably believed a superior had authorized under the
circumstances.392 Commanders may not always be perfectly clear or
385. ORDERS 100, supra note 94, art. 14.
386. See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 38, at 52-53 (articulating the principle of
military necessity and citing numerous treatises).
387. See id. at 53.
388. See id. at 54 (citing sources).
389. See, e.g., id. at 54 n.27.
390. See 10 U.S.C. § 818 (a) (2012 & Supp. IV 2017).
391. Recall that Winthrop noted destruction of public or private property was a crime
unless pursuant to superior orders. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
392. See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 38, at 1076-77.
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precise when articulating a subordinate’s duties or permissible
discretion.393 With that said, especially in light of Article 18, it
would never be reasonable for a subordinate to imply that a com-
mander has authorized an obvious law of war violation.394
C. Obedience to Orders
The preceding analysis clarifies the origin, scope, and substance
of the obedience to orders defense. As was articulated in the 1951
Manual and just alluded to, obedience to orders is part of the public
authority justification defense.395 Members of the armed forces have
a legal obligation to follow the lawful orders of their military super-
iors.396 Such orders not only confer public authority but also impose
a public duty, which must be performed reasonably and in good
faith.397 They therefore inform the sope of one’s public authority.
Unlawful orders are ultra vires and cannot confer public authority
or create a public duty to act. As stated in the Law of War Manual,
“Each member of the armed services has a duty to ... refuse to
comply with clearly illegal orders to commit violations of the law of
war.”398 Hence, as with public authority generally, the reasonable-
ness of one’s actions is critical. The duty to disobey only “clearly
illegal” orders flows logically from the reasonableness requirement.
Plausibly lawful orders may reasonably be followed. It is only unrea-
sonable to follow clearly or manifestly unlawful orders.
Because all members of the U.S. military must comply with the
law of war, “[s]ubordinates are not required to screen the orders of
superiors for questionable points of legality, and may, absent
specific knowledge to the contrary, presume that orders have been
lawfully issued.”399 Additionally, the law of war sometimes imposes
393. See generally id. at 1076-77, 1076 n.31.
394. See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 38, at 1076 (“Commands and orders should not
be understood as implicitly authorizing violations of the law of war where other interpreta-
tions are reasonably available.”).
395. See 1951 MCM, supra note 153, ch. 28, ¶ 197.
396. See 10 U.S.C. § 890 (2012), amended by 10 U.S.C. § 890 (Supp. IV 2017); 10 U.S.C.
§ 891(2) (Supp. IV 2017); id. § 892(1); see also LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 38, at 1087.
397. See 10 U.S.C. § 892(3) (punishing willful and negligent dereliction in the performance
of duties).
398. See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 38, at 1074 (emphasis added).
399. Id. at 1076 & n.30 (citing sources).
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requirements upon a specific individual, such as the commander
ordering an attack.400 Service members may rely on a commander’s
determination of the legality of such action unless or until they
possess sufficient information to determine that an action is clearly
or manifestly illegal.401 To the extent UCMJ Article 18 implements
the law of war, no authorization or order issued by any military au-
thority may contravene that legislative choice. The question then
becomes whether a President possesses constitutional authority to
order or authorize war crimes or other law of war violations even
though his subordinate commanders do not.
V. ARTICLE 18 AND PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY
With this more complete understanding of the UCMJ’s imple-
mentation of the law of war, let us now consider its effect on the
president’s authority to direct military operations in an armed
conflict. This Part first analyzes whether the law of war component
of Article 18 limits the President’s constitutional authority over the
military as Commander-in-Chief in an armed conflict. Concluding
that it does, it then explains the practical effect of this limitation on
a President’s authority to authorize or order law of war violations
by examining potential presidential authorizations (or orders) to
torture, or to kill the family members of terrorists.
A. Congress, the Armed Forces, and the Commander-in-Chief
Presidents and the Office of Legal Counsel have sometimes
claimed that congressional wartime regulation of the President or
military violates the separation of powers.402 Such claims are clearly
400. For example, the commander ordering an attack necessarily determines whether the
attack complies with the proportionality requirement. See infra notes 434-35 and accom-
panying text.
401. See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 38, at 1076.
402. See, e.g., Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1193-94 (2006) (“Indeed, [constitutional] avoidance [doctrine] has taken
center stage in many of the most controversial episodes of executive branch legal
interpretation relating to the ‘war on terror.’ It appeared prominently, for example, in the
leaked (and later withdrawn) ‘torture memorandum’ issued by the Justice Department’s
Office of Legal Counsel, in the Justice Department’s defense of the National Security Agency’s
warrantless wiretapping program, and in President George W. Bush’s narrow construction
of a statute banning the cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of detainees.” (footnotes
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dubious when Congress regulates the military. The Supreme Court
has consistently held that Congress has plenary authority to reg-
ulate the armed forces, particularly with regard to matters of
discipline.403 This authority is based in Congress’s powers to “raise,”
“maintain,” and “support” the military,404 and particularly “[t]o
make rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces.”405 The Framers of our Constitution deemed the power
to regulate the military essential to the national defense,406 and
specifically vested that power in Congress rather than the Presi-
dent.407 In the words of the Court, Congress’s “control over the whole
subject of the formation, organization, and government of the
national armies, including therein the punishment of offenses
committed by persons in the military service, would seem to be
plenary.”408 At a minimum, a President’s obligation to “take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed” obligates him or her to abide
by statutes regulating military discipline.409
omitted)).
403. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) (“[T]he Constitution contemplates
that Congress has ‘plenary control over rights, duties, and responsibilities in the framework
of the Military Establishment, including regulations, procedures, and remedies related to
military discipline.’” (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983))); Solorio v.
United States, 483 U.S. 435, 446 (1987) (“The unqualified language of Clause 14 suggests that
whatever these concerns, they were met by vesting in Congress, rather than the Executive,
authority to make rules for the government of the military.”); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137,
140 (1953) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be
conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty .... The Framers
expressly entrusted that task to Congress.”).
404. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cls. 12-13.
405. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 14.
406. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 226 (James Madison) (Glazier & Co. 1826) (emphasizing,
among other things, the necessity of powers to regulate militia and armed forces because
“[s]ecurity against foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil society. It is an avowed
and essential object of the American union. The powers requisite for attaining it, must be
effectually confided to the federal councils.”).
407. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 406, at 234 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The president
is to be commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his
authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in sub-
stance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and
direction of the military and naval forces, as first general and admiral of the confederacy:
while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war, and to the raising and
regulating of fleets and armies; all which, by the constitution under consideration, would
appertain to the legislature.”).
408. Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 514 (1878).
409. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 3.
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Congress’s broad powers over both war and the military are
undoubtedly why an extensive study of the commander-in-chief
power yielded “surprisingly little Founding-era evidence supporting
the notion that the conduct of military campaigns is beyond
legislative control and a fair amount of evidence that affirmatively
undermines it.”410 Additionally, “the Supreme Court has never held
that any statutory limitations on substantive executive war powers
have unconstitutionally infringed the core prerogatives of the Com-
mander in Chief.”411 These conclusions find support in the words of
Justice Robert Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer:
When the President takes measures incompatible with the ex-
pressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest
ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers
minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.
Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case
only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.412
All of this severely undermines any notion that the President may
ignore congressional regulation of the armed forces, even when such
regulation applies to battlefield conduct in an armed conflict. It is
hard to conceive of how a court could disable Congress from acting
pursuant to an express grant of constitutional authority, particu-
larly when coupled with the Necessary and Proper Clause.
If a President were to nevertheless assert a separation of powers
concern, the Necessary and Proper Clause provides additional sup-
port for Congress’s power to limit a President’s discretion to direct
the military as he or she sees fit. In addition to its express powers
over both war and the military, Congress may also “make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution [its
express] Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof.”413 Even assuming Congress’s plenary power to
410. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689,
696 (2008).
411. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 1106 (2008).
412. 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
413. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
2018] THE LAW OF WAR 889
regulate the armed forces does not inherently include the President
in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, its rules at the very least
limit a President’s permissible discretion in that role as a necessary
incident to its plenary regulatory authority.414 A President may no
more ignore the UCMJ’s execution of the law of war than he may
ignore the UCMJ’s procedural requirements for convening military
tribunals or imposing punishment upon a member of the military.
Additionally, there is no obvious reason to believe that Congress’s
power to make necessary and proper laws with respect to “all other
Powers vested by th[e] Constitution in the Government ... or in any
Department or Officer thereof”415 does not include the commander-
in-chief power vested in the President. Indeed, Congress’s superior
regulatory authority over the military is apparent in the language
of the early Articles of War and is recognized in other historical
practice and commentary.416 It therefore seems quite clear that
Congress possesses constitutional power to require the military to
comply with the law of war and that its decision to do so cannot be
superseded by the President.417 Under fundamental principles of
statutory interpretation, neither courts nor Presidents should
interpret a congressional declaration of war or an authorization to
use military force to repeal existing laws regulating the military’s
war-related activities.418 This includes the law of war compliance
required by UCMJ Article 18.
The constitutional issues clearly differ when it comes to civilians
accompanying the military during an armed conflict. Relying on
Congress’s war powers, the Supreme Court has upheld the use of
414. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 411, at 1013-16.
415. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
416. For citation and discussion of relevant authority, see Dehn, supra note 193, at 612-16. 
417. Cf. Barron & Lederman, supra note 410, at 696-97 (arguing that the President must
retain “a prerogative of superintendence,” meaning, “the President must to some considerable
extent retain control over the vast reservoirs of military discretion that exist in every armed
conflict, even when bounded by important statutory limitations; and thus Congress may not
assign such ultimate decisionmaking discretion to anyone else (including subordinate military
officers)”).
418. See Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 468 (1982) (“[W]henever possible,
statutes should be read consistently.”); see also United States v. United Cont’l Tuna Corp., 425
U.S. 164, 168 (1976) (“It is, of course, a cardinal principle of statutory construction that
repeals by implication are not favored.” (citations omitted)); id. at 169 (“The principle
[disfavoring implied repeal] carries special weight when we are urged to find that a specific
statute has been repealed by a more general one.” (citations omitted)).
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military tribunals to punish a civilian U.S. citizen who violated
German penal laws during post-war military occupation.419 Other
than the earlier-cited dicta,420 however, the Supreme Court has not
addressed constitutional authority to punish war crimes or other
law of war violations by civilians acting on behalf of rather than
against the security interests of the United States.421
Although Congress has plenary constitutional authority to reg-
ulate the military, its use of the UCMJ to regulate civilians accom-
panying the military in an armed conflict, if constitutionally proper
at all, likely depends upon the aggregate of its war powers, its
powers over the military, and the Necessary and Proper Clause.422
Although deserving of more thorough analysis in the future, placing
civilians under the UCMJ and jurisdiction of courts-martial may be
justified on several grounds. First, Congress may believe it an ap-
propriate measure to meet international treaty and customary
obligations to prevent or punish war crimes and other law of war
violations by those, including civilians, acting on behalf of the
United States.423 Second, Congress may deem it necessary and
proper to meet international treaty and customary obligations to
maintain order in American-occupied territory.424 And finally, Con-
gress may deem it necessary to preserving good order and discipline
in the armed forces by ensuring civilians accompanying the military
may be punished for any act that could be punished if committed by
a military member.425 Congress’s desire to require law of war com-
pliance by civilians accompanying the armed forces “[i]n time of
419. See Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 348-62 (1952).
420. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
421. In both Milligan and Quirin, the citizen defendants tried by military tribunal were
accused of acting against the security interests of the United States. See Ex parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1, 21 (1942); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 6 (1866).
422. Its powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause include the power to implement
treaties binding upon the government in war. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432
(1920) (“If the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute under
Article I, § 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government.”).
The analysis here addresses only the separation of powers and not other constitutional issues
raised by placing civilians within the jurisdiction of courts-martial, such as the right to jury
trial.
423. See supra notes 354-56 and accompanying text.
424. See, e.g., GC IV, supra note 50, arts. 64-67.
425. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 38, at 1119-20.
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declared war or a contingency operation”426 should therefore be un-
derstood to limit a President’s authority to authorize the law of war
violations made punishable by Article 18,427 at least until a court
reviews Congress’s constitutional authority in this area.
B. Presidential Discretion and Practical Limits
Accepting these arguments for the sake of analysis, we can briefly
evaluate a President’s practical ability to authorize torture or other
ill treatment, or to “take out” the family members of terrorists. As
discussed in the introduction, torture and cruel treatment are war
crimes and also generally applicable federal crimes in both inter-
national and non-international armed conflict.428 Under the law of
war, no circumstances justify the use of torture. Because most
reprisals are prohibited and must have the goal of inducing law of
war compliance rather than imposing punishment, the use of
torture because terrorists “deserve it” is unlawful and prohibited by
Article 18.429 Furthermore, anyone detained in an armed conflict
must be treated humanely.430 At a minimum, this prohibits cruel,
426. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2012).
427. See Dehn, supra note 193, at 637-38. The analysis would differ with regard to civilian
members of other government agencies to any extent Congress may provide those agencies
with authority to violate international law generally or the law of war specifically. See Barron
& Lederman, supra note 410, at 715. In any such cases, the general UCMJ requirements
made applicable to civilians accompanying the military should not be interpreted to curtail
other authority specifically granted to an agency by Congress. Of course, that does not mean
other federal law, such as the War Crimes Act, would not limit any such agencies.
428. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
429. See supra Part III.C.1; see also HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 238, at 519-
29 (listing prohibited reprisals against persons and property protected by the Geneva
Conventions and their protocols). The study states that some reprisals are still permitted but
tightly controlled. Id. at 513-18. The Law of War Manual also asserts that a narrow and
tightly circumscribed power to engage in reprisals still exists in the law of war. LAW OF WAR
MANUAL, supra note 38, at 1110-17.
430. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 238, at 306-07. The Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005 provides, “no individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United
States Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.” Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-148, § 1003(a), 119 Stat. 2739 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd-0(1) (2012)).
Additionally, the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act enacted additional restrictions,
including that an individual “in the custody or under the effective control of an officer, em-
ployee, or other agent of the United States Government; or ... detained within a facility owned,
operated, or controlled by a department or agency of the United States, in any armed conflict,”
may not be “subjected to any interrogation technique or approach,” or any interrogation-
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inhuman, or degrading treatment, such as corporal punishment and
other uses of force unrelated to the purpose of preventing escape or
maintaining physical security.431 Article 18 of the UCMJ therefore
unconditionally prohibits all torture and ill treatment of those
detained by the U.S. military or by any civilians assisting in that
detention.432 Thus, a President may not order or authorize the mem-
bers of the military or any civilians accompanying it in armed con-
flict to engage in the torture or ill treatment of any detained
individual.
The legal issues raised by a hypothetical order to kill the family
members of terrorists are more nuanced. As earlier noted, intention-
ally attacking innocent civilians is a war crime in both international
and non-international armed conflict.433 However, harm to innocent
civilians incident to an otherwise lawful attack, even if known or
anticipated in advance, is permitted if not “clearly excessive” in
relation to the direct and concrete military advantage anticipated
from the attack.434 This is known as the proportionality principle,
the violation of which is also a war crime.435 Although this principle
is objective in theory, determining the military advantage of a given
attack, or whether anticipated collateral harm is “clearly excessive”
in relation to that advantage, is a fact-intensive assessment that en-
tails the exercise of judgment and is therefore necessarily somewhat
subjective.
For example, former government officials stated that there was
significant uncertainty regarding whether Osama bin Laden was in
the Abbottabad, Pakistan compound where he was killed.436 The
United States had surveilled the compound and knew there were
men, women, and children resembling bin Laden’s family and other
associates there.437 President Obama reportedly rejected the idea of
related treatment, “that is not [expressly] authorized by ... Army Field Manual 2-22.3.”
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, § 1045(a)(2), 129
Stat. 726, 977 (2015) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd-2 (Supp. III 2015)). 
431. See supra Part IV.A.
432. See 10 U.S.C. § 818(a) (Supp. IV 2017).
433. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
434. See, e.g., HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 238, at 46-50.
435. See, e.g., ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
436. See, e.g., CIA Chief Panetta: Obama Made ‘Gutsy’ Decision on Bin Laden Raid, PBS
(May 3, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism-jan-june11-panetta_05-
03/ [https://perma.cc/629P-MFEE].
437. Id. 
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“a B-2 bombing attack” due to concerns about collateral harm.438
There is no doubt those concerns were heightened by the lack of
certainty regarding bin Laden’s presence. What is the anticipated
military advantage of an attack when one is only 60 to 80 percent
certain that the intended target is present?439 How much collateral
harm might be justified by eliminating the leader of an enemy
armed group like al Qaeda? These are difficult questions with no
clear answers. Thus, the bin Laden operation demonstrates that the
proportionality principle is more easily stated than applied.
Note also that, practically speaking, it is principally the person
ordering or authorizing an attack who applies the proportionality
principle and resolves these difficult issues. If President Obama had
ordered a bombing attack of the Abbottabad compound, few in the
military chain of command between the President and the pilots
would be fully aware of the (likely highly classified) information
upon which he relied. Even though the target was a civilian struc-
ture far away from any battlefield, members of the military
executing that attack may reasonably presume that any such order
was based upon adequate information and consistent with the law
of war. A member of the military would only need to clarify the
order if he or she acquired additional information that called its
legality into serious question.440
Complicating matters further, in some cases, family members
may themselves be directly and lawfully targeted. First, although
civilians are generally protected from direct attack, they lose this
protection “for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”441
Determining whether an individual is taking a direct part in
hostilities can be a fact-intensive inquiry and difficult to assess.
According to recent guidance from the ICRC:
Acts amounting to direct participation in hostilities must meet
three cumulative requirements: (1) a threshold regarding the
harm likely to result from the act, (2) a relationship of direct
438. Id.
439. Massimo Calabresi, CIA Chief: Pakistan Would Have Jeopardized bin Laden
Operation, TIME (May 3, 2011), http://swampland.time.com/2011/05/03/cia-chief-breaks-
silence-u-s-ruled-out-involving-pakistan-in-bin-laden-raid-early-on/ [https://perma.cc/579W-
A5B2].
440. See supra Part IV.C.
441. See, e.g., HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 238, at 19-20 (Rule 6).
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causation between the act and the expected harm, and (3) a
belligerent nexus between the act and the hostilities conducted
between the parties to an armed conflict.442
Although logical, these criteria require evaluating the conduct of an
individual in relation to the activities of others in what are often
complex battlefield environments.443 This may be why the ICRC’s
guidance has been criticized for “demonstrat[ing] a general failure
to fully appreciate the operational complexity of modern warfare.”444
However, it is certainly possible that a family member might engage
in acts that clearly constitute taking a direct part in the hostilities
of an armed conflict. If so, he or she would become targetable while
doing so.
Family members may also be lawfully targeted if they are mem-
bers of a non-state armed group that is party to an armed conflict.
In physical appearance and manner of dress, such individuals may
be indistinguishable from civilian family members or other civilians.
Therefore, their status as members of an armed group must be
determined based upon their actions. Recent ICRC guidance
suggests that such individuals must have a “continuous combat
function,” which is also a complex, fact-based inquiry.445 The ICRC
guidance provides:
For ... practical purposes ... membership in such groups cannot
depend on abstract affiliation, family ties, or other criteria prone
to error, arbitrariness or abuse. Instead, membership must
depend on whether the continuous function assumed by an
individual corresponds to that collectively exercised by the group
as a whole, namely the conduct of hostilities on behalf of a non-
State party to the conflict.446
Although this too is an entirely logical approach, its practical ap-
plication is clearly difficult. It requires detailed knowledge of an
individual’s activities, as well as the relationship of those activities
442. MELZER, supra note 286, at 46. 
443. See id. at 70-71; see also Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in
Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. POL. 697, 699-704 (2010).
444. Schmitt, supra note 443, at 699.
445. MELZER, supra note 286, at 27.
446. Id. at 33.
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to a larger group, which is composed of members to whom the same
analysis must be applied. It can obviously be quite difficult to ob-
serve or collect and assess this information on a complex or remote
battlefield, or when members of a group hide among civilians in
villages or cities.
The onus is upon the individual ordering an attack to act rea-
sonably and in good faith when assessing available information to
decide whether an individual may be targeted under the law of
war.447 The quantity and quality of information regarding whether
an individual is a member of a non-state armed group or is taking
direct part in hostilities might vary widely. Other than in the
clearest cases of error, however, or when new circumstances or in-
formation calls into question an earlier decision, the person making
the targeting decision is responsible for its accuracy.448 Further-
more, although the military may not violate the law of war, under
domestic law the individual authorizing or ordering an attack need
only act “reasonably” when making these assessments, whether that
person is a sergeant, a colonel, a general, or a President.449
In spite of these difficulties, there are certainly cases when
individuals ordered or authorized to engage in actions that would
violate the law of war will know an order or authorization is mani-
festly unlawful. The My Lai massacre was clearly unlawful. Any
order to kill “all military age males,” for example, is also manifestly
unlawful because it does not require a good faith effort to distin-
guish between innocent civilians protected from attack and those
who may be targeted based upon any of the above criteria. In
situations when the law of war requires the collection and evalua-
tion of information and the exercise of judgment, however, it is
possible for a President to order or authorize the military to engage
in acts that may technically violate the law of war without that fact
being manifestly obvious to the individuals executing his or her
order.
447. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 238, at 51-67; see also MELZER, supra
note 286, at 72-73.
448. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 238, at 55-56.
449. See MELZER, supra note 286, at 35.
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CONCLUSION
There are certainly many pragmatic reasons for the President and
military to comply with the law of war.450 Recent history demon-
strates that these pragmatic considerations do not always carry the
day.451 Public statements by the current President suggest that they
may not do so in the future. Although the Department of Defense
states that soldiers must “comply with the law of war in good faith”
and refuse to follow “illegal orders to commit violations of the law of
war,”452 it has not been clear whether this includes all law of war
violations, or whether a President possesses constitutional authority
to issue a “controlling executive act” ordering or authorizing the
military to violate the law of war.
This Article clarified how the UCMJ broadly implements the law
of war and authorizes criminal punishment for most violations of it.
A President may only authorize law of war violations that do not
entail or result in a UCMJ offense, or potentially those that fall
within the extraordinarily narrow scope of reprisals still permitted
by the law of war. Unless Congress is persuaded to change the law
of war component of Article 18, it seems clear that a President lacks
constitutional authority to authorize the military to violate (most of)
the law of war.
450. See, e.g., LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 38, at 1072-74.
451. A prime example is the Bush Administration’s legal arguments to engage in abusive
interrogation practices that some called “enhanced interrogation” and others called torture.
See generally THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua
L. Dratel eds., 2005); PHILLIPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD’S MEMO AND THE BETRAYAL
OF AMERICAN VALUES (2008).
452. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 38, at 1074.
